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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

KAMAS SECURITIES COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
--vs--

_Case No..7398

MOSES C. TAYLOR,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action commenced by the plaintiff corpora..tion to recover a judgment against the defendant upon the
following theories, as announced by the court at the trial
and as appears at page 4 of the Record:
1
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1. Did the defendant falsely represent to the plain. .
tiff that the notes referred to were secured by approximately
30 shares of stock belonging to Elliott C. Taylor?
2.

Was such representation false?

3. Did the plaintiff reasonably rely upon such repre . .
sentation?
4.

Was plaintiff proxima~ely damaged thereby?

5.

Did the defendant wrongfully fail to accept the

offer of Elliott C. Taylor in satisfaction of the obligation
represented by the notes?
The plaintiff filed three cornplaints, the last of \vhich,
being designated as "Second Amended Complaint," \vas
filed the day of the trial, September 20, 1948. In all of
these complaints, the plaintiff is designated "Kamas Securities Company, a corporation, Plaintiff." This last complaint
sets forth a claim that, in 1934, the defendant, acting in
behalf of the Kamas State Bank, falsely represented to the
plaintiff corporation that the Kamas State Bank held a
certain certificate of stock O\vned by Elliott Taylor for 30
shares of stock in the Kamas State Bank as security for
the payment of said note of $2,000.00. This complaint fur . .
ther sets forth, in paragraph 4, that the note for $2,000.00
was transferred from the Kamas State Bank to the plaintiff
corporation on February 13, 1934, for a valuable considera. .
tion and that the note v1as transferred by endorsement.
The complaint further sets forth, in this paragraph, that
the defendant falsely represented to the plaintiff corpora. .
tion, upon the transfer of said promissory note above al. .
leged, that he was holding certificate for 30 shares of stock
in the Kamas State Bank as security for the payment of
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said pron1issory note, for and on behalf of the said plain-tiff corporation; that the plaintiff corporation in accepting
said promissory note and paying therefor the valuable con-sideration, as 2.1leged above, relied upon the representa-tions of the defendant, as alleged above; that the de-fendant represented at the aforesaid time that said certifi-cate for 30 shares of stock in the Kamas Stat~{?Bank had
been endorsed in blank by said Elliott C. Taylor.
Paragraph 6 of the complaint sets forth that, in Janu-ary, 1935, Elliott Taylor executed to the plaintiff corporation his rene\val note and two notes for accrued interest,
v:hich notes were placed in and retained in the custody of
defendant as secretary of the plaintiff corporation; that at
said tirne the defendant falsely represented to the plaintiff
corporation that he continued to hold the certificate of stock
representing the 30 shares of stock as security for the pay-ment of the renewal note and the two notes for accrued
interest, relying upon the allegations hereinbefore alleged.
Paragraph 7 of the complaint sets forth that on many
subsequent occasions the defendant reiterated the false
representation to the other officers of the plaintiff corpora-tion and to William D. Callister, its attorney, that the
stock certificate had been and was being held by him, in
his custody, as security for the indebtedness represented by
the promissory note described in paragraph_ 3 and, later,
as security for the indebtedness represented by the three
promissory notes described in paragraph 6.
In paragraph 8 it is allaged that the plaintiff corpora-tion, relying upon the false representations and feeling itself
secure, allowed the statute of limitations to run on the
notes.
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Paragraph 9 sets out three occasions, between 1940
and 1943, when it is claimed the defendant represented
to the other officers that Elliott Taylor had offered the 30
shares to the corporation in full settlement of the three
promissory notes, and that the president, Knight, and vice
president, Warr, and the attorney, William D. Callister,
had particularly, on the 16th day of June, 1943, instructed
the defendant to accept the 30 shares of stock in satisfac-) tion of the promissory notes and to make the necessary
transfer of the stock to the plaintiff corporation; and that
the defendant wholly failed and refused to transfer the
stock.
Paragraph 10 of the complaint sets out that, after the
statute of limitations had run and after having refused to
transfer the stock, the defendant, without the consent or
authority of the plaintiff corporation, returned the stock
to Elliott C. Taylor, in violation· of his office of trust as
the secretary of the corporation.
It was based upon the above allegations of the com-plaint that the court, at the time of trial, announced the
theory of recovery as heretofore set forth. In other words,
the recovery was to be the false representation of the de-fendant and his failure to follow the direction of the offi..
cers of the corporation in transferring the stock. There is
no claim of any conversion in this case, but the claim is
asserted to a breach of trust or responsibility by the de-fendant as an officer of the plaintiff corporation. As ap-pears at page 168 of the Record, William D. Callister, the
attorney for the plaintiff, stating the position of plaintiff
corporation, testified:

Q.

So your position and your advice is there
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\Yas never any pledge of this stock, there \vas never
any security of the Kamas State stock?
:\.

.:-\fter Mr. Taylor denied it, yes.

This would preclude any theory of _the stock having
ever been pledged, particularly in view of the complaint
and the findings of fact wherein the allegation is always that
the defendant falsely represented that there was a pledge.
The findings of fact, which follow closely the second
amended complaint, set out in paragraph 4 that on the
13th day of February, 1934, the defendant, acting in be~
half of the Kamas State Bank, falsely represented to the
plaintiff corporation that the Kamas State Bank held a
certain certificate of stock as security for the payment of
the three promissory notes, and that the Kamas State
Bank, for a valuable consideration, transferred the notes
to the plaintiff corporation, in accepting the notes, relied
upon the false representation as to the pledge of the security, and that at that time the defendant falsely repre~
sented that the 30 shares of stock had been endorsed in
blank by Elliott C. Taylor.
Paragraph 7 of hte findings sets out the fact that the
defendant, on various occasions, reiterated the false repre~
sentations that he held the stock as security.
The 8th finding of fact is that the plaintiff corpora~
tion, relying upon the false representations, permitted the
statute of limitations to run against all three notes.
Paragraph 9 of the findings is to the effect that the de~
fendant had, on the various occasions, represented to the
officers and agents of the plaintiff corporation that .Elliott
C. Taylor had offered the 30 shares of stock to the plain~
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tiff corporation in full settletnent of the three promissory
notes, and that the plaintiff corporation, through its attor. .
ney, Callister, had by letter of June 16, 1943, and by con . .
versations in July and August of 1943, instructed the de . .
fendant to accept the 30 shares of stock as offered by EI. .
liott C. Taylor in full satisfaction of the said promissory
notes and to make the necessary transfer of the stock to the
plaintiff corporation.
The 1Oth finding is that the defendant, acting fraudu . .
lently, and vvith intent to injure the plaintiff corporation,
and in violation of his office of trust, returned the stock
to Elliott C. Taylor in the forepart of 1944.
The 11th finding is that the stock, at the time it was
returned, had a reasonable value of $60.00 per share.
The 12th finding is to the effect that the Knight family
owned 54 per cent of the stock of the plaintiff corporation
and made a gift of shares of stock to Virgil King and Elmo
Hoyt, two of the directors of the plaintiff corporation.
The 13th finding of fact is that, at a meeting of the
plaintiff corporation in July, 1946, A. W. Warr requested
legal action be brought against the defendant for the defendant's false representations and the return of the stock
to Elliott Taylor, and the directors refused to accept the re . .
quest of W arr to bring this action.
The 14th finding is that A. W. Warr, as president of
the corporation and acting for the corporation, and A. W.
W arr, for himself individually and for others similarly situ. .
ated, holding stock and debentures of the plaintiff com. .
pany, brought this suit against the defendant to recover as. .
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sets \vhich the defendant fraudulently deprived said corpor~
ation of.
The 15th finding is for damages in the surn of
$1800.00, being the reasonable value of the stock at the
time it \Vas \vrongfully returned by the defendant to Elliott
C. Taylor.
The cou1:t made a finding to be included as a part of
paragraph 9 (a) of the findings in which it found that the
defendant had in his possession the 30 shares of stock for
the purpose of using the stock -vvhich belonged to Elliott
Taylor in effecting a complete and final settlement of his
account and the stock to be delivered to the corporation
only upon the corporation accepting the stock in full and
complete settlement and satisfaction of the indebtedness of
Elliott Taylor; that since the year 1936 or 1937 the de~
fendant had advised the Board of Directors that the stock
was available to the corporation if accepted in full settle~
ment; that at no time prior to June 16, 1943, had the
Board of Directors of the plaintiff corporation communi~
cated to the defendant that they accepted the offer of Elliott
Taylor of the said s~ares of stock in full settlement of his
indebtedness. It is to be noted, here, that the court had re~
fused the request to find that the board of directors of the
plaintiff corporation had ever acted to accept the offer. The
court has made no finding on that request whatsoever ex~
cept as above indicated.
The conclusions of the law is that plaintiff is entitled
to a decree of the court declaring, ordering and adjudging
the defendant to deliver the 30 shares of stock to the plaintiff and, in the event that he doesn't deliver the stock, that
the plaintiff recover judgment for $1,800.00 with interest
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from the 1st day of September, 1944.
The judgment is that the plaintiff have judgment for
the 30 shares of stock or for the sum of $2,259 .00, with
interest at 8 per cent from the date of the judgment. The
judgment also awards the plaintiff $204.00 as costs of
court.
The facts of this case as shown by the evidence are
as follows:
Along with all of the other banks in the coun-try, the Kamas State Bank was closed during the
bank holiday declared by President Roosevelt. Dur-ing the holiday, it became necessary for the bank
to raise $10,000.00 in cash before the bank exam-iner would permit it to open. This money was raised
by the defendant and two other directors, and they
necer received any consideration for the money so
raised, it being given to the bank as a gift. (R. pp.
183 and 198) Subsequently, the bank was required
by the bank examiner to raise additional cash in
order to qualify for the Federal bank deposit insur-ance. This required the bank to dispose of a number
of its slow assets and replace them with cash. This
program was presented to the stockholders of the
bank and, accordingly, there were sold to the stock-holders of the bank certain of the assets in ex-change for cash furnished by the stockholders. The
stockholders then turned the assets they had purchased from the bank over to the plaintiff corpora-tion, which was then organized, in exchange for
shares of stock and debentures of plaintiff corpora-tion. Among the assets transferred to the stockhold-ers were the three notes of Elliott Taylor, the $2,-000.00 note representing a renewal of his note given
in 1929 and the note for $500.00 and the one for
$250.00 having been given to the Kamas State Bank
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to pay a stock assessment levied by the bank; the
t\VO notes representing the assessment on tvvo certifi. .
cates of stock o\vned by Elliott Taylor, one being for
10 and the other for 20 shares.
The representations as to the security for the notes of
Elliott Taylor purported to take place at a meeting of the
plaintiff corporation held subsequent to its incorporation
and on February 13, 1934, which was the first annual meet. .
ing of the stockholders.
The articles of incorporation show that the plaintiff
corporation had a capital stock of 2500 shares of a par
value of $1.00 per share, of which 2,000 shares were to be ·
placed in the treasury to be disposed of by a res~lution of
the board of directors. The articles show $500.00 of the
stock to have been subscribed to and paid for by five of the
original incorporators.
At the 1934 annual meeting in February it was deter..mined that all of the outstanding stock be called in and
stock be reissued in proportion to the amount invested in
the company. The meeting adjourned to permit the can . .
cellation and issuance of the new stock and reconvened on
that day with the full 2400 shares of stock having been
issued and being present.
The minutes of a directors' meeting of the same day
show that the treasurer was instructed to issue debentures
in $1,000.00 amounts or fractions thereof pursuant to the
instructions of the owners. The further directors' mee.ting
earlier in the morning on that date is shown to have or..dered the stock of the company turned back and a new
issue of the stock in amounts proportionate to the amount
of money invested by those to whom the ones making the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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investment may direct, and that all of the stock authorized
to be issued by the Company be issued in the same propor-tion to those to whom the money was invested may direct.
As to whether any representation or statement \vas
made by Moses Taylor at the meeting of the plaintiff cor-poration in February, 1934, the testimony at the trial shows
the following:
Warr, the party who signed the complaint for
the plaintiff corporation, at page 41 of the Record
was asked if Moses Taylor said anything in that
meeting and answered that Moses Taylor had in-dicated there were $38,000.00 worth of notes and
that the money they would have to put up would
be about $34,000.00.

Q. In other words, there was a general dis-cussion as to hovv much the assets v1ould be that
would be turned over by the depositors to the cor-poration?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Is that it?

A.

There was no discussion as I know of. Mr.
Taylor - 1v1oses Taylor - told us just how much
we had and we accepted it.

Q. There was nothing in detail

presente~

to

you?

A.
Q.
A.

No.
Just lump sum large figures mentioned?
That's all.

At page 87 of the Record, Knight, another director
of the plaintiff corporation and a witness for the plaintiff,
states:
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Q.

Didn't you state at the tin1e of your de,J
position in September, 1948, that the first recollec,J
tlon you had of any discussion ever being held as
to these notes was in 1936?

_-\.

I may have done, but I was also asked to

refresh my memory on dates.
~\s appears at pages

87 and 88 of the Record, Knight
said that he \Vent to the minutes to refresh his recollection,
then admits that the minutes didn't refresh his recollec. .
tion but that there were some letters, and the testimony
shows that he couldn't produce or describe the letters,
\Vhich \~/ere supposed to have refreshed his recollection since
the taking of the deposition. However, most important in
Knight's testimony is his statement on cross . .examination
at pages 91 and 92 of the Record wherein he states:

Q.

And, as Mr. Warr testified, then, merely
the total of the notes with the list was shown?
A.

The-

Q.

That's the '34 meeting?

A.

Each note and its amount was there.

Q.

That was what was told the stockholders?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And it was lumped in one large sum?

A. Well, each note was listed separate and
its amount.

Q.

And it was also tabulated and totalled?

A. Yes.
Q. So, it was a general discussion, wasn't it?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

They didn't discuss any particular notes,

did they?

A.

l~o.

Further, at pages 95 and 96, the witness, Knight, on
cross..-examination admitted that for all of the years fror.o
1936 through 1944, inclusive, he could not state of any
occasion \vhen anything was said about the bank stock or
of any individual vvho had said anything about the stock
or anything in any manner or in any v1ay referring to the
bank stock.
At page 96 of the Record the witness, Knight, states
that he never did know whether the stock was held as a
chattel mort~ge, as q pledge, or by way of offer, but he did
know that, if the plaintiff corporation was to get the stock,
they \vould only get it if they would accept it in full settle. .
ment of all of Elliott Taylor's obligations.
At page 100 of the H.ecord, the witness, Knight, on
cross-examination, was asked this question by the court:

Q. If you were to get the stock, then you had
to take it as full settlement?
A.

That was what we were always told.

THE COURT: There is no dispute about that,
apparently; at least, that is Mr. Warr's testimony,
too.
The entire deposition of Knight is in evidence, and
at pages 27 and 28 of that deposition the witness Knight
was asked if he could mention a conversation at any time
and give the words that Moses Taylor used in .connection
with the notes or the bank stock. The witness refused to
answer when asked:
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Q.

\\'hy \Veren't you going to ans\ver?

. .\. Because it \Yould be pretty hard for a person to remember eight or nine years the exact words
of a conversation \Vith exact date of just such a
conversation. ~-\11 I can give you is the impression
I gained at that time.

Q.

You are not pretending to tell me the
exact \Vords, now - that is still just a matter of
impression?
A. Yes, that is the impression. I know the
\Vord "collateral" and "security" was used.

Q.

Whether that was a chattel mortgage, or
just how it was represented, you don't know?

A.

No.

Q.

And you never attempted to inquire?

A.

No.

It is clear from the foregoing testimony of Knight that
he and Warr were in harmony on the proposition that
the only mater that was presented to the meeting by Moses
Taylor, the defendant, was that the assets were worth so
much money, and that nothing was said in detail about any
of the notes. There is nothing in the testimony to show
when the notes were transferred to the plaintiff corpora..tion. It is clear that the plaintiff corporation did not raise
the money that was paid to the Kamas Bank. That money
had been raised and paid to the bank by the stockholders
and depositors of the bank who took in exchange from the
bank certain of its assets. These assets were then turned
in to the plaintiff corporation in exchange for its stock
and debentures. Facts further show that 'in 1936 the col..lection of the various obligations owing the plaintiff cor..Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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poration was taken out of the hands of Moses Taylor, the
secretary, and the responsibility given to F. T. Knight, the
witness heretofore referred to.
All of the minutes of the corporation are a part of the
I\.ecord in this case, and the minutes of a special rneeting
of the board of directors, held November 23, 1936, show
that F. T. Knight was authorized to arrange with an at. .
torney to handle the collection of the notes of this company
on a percentage basis. Defendant's Exhibit 3, a letter fron1
Attorney Callister to the plaintiff company, dated t.Jovem. .
ber 21, 1936, reports that he investigated Elliott C. Tay. .
lor and that he found that he had neither an automobile
nor real property in his name and that it would be futile to
bring suit against him at that time unless assets were dis . .
cov~red. f-Ie recommended that it would be wise for the
plaintiff corporation to take a judgment against Taylor in
the near future for the purpose of prolonging the statute
of lilnitations and to watch out for assets. The evidence
shows that this letter was written pursuant to the employ. .
ment of Callister by Knight for the plaintiff corporation, to
collect on all of these notes and receive 25 per cent of all
sums collected.
The minutes further show that at the meeting on No. .
ve1nber 19, 1938, the president was instructed as follows:
"The president is further instructed to bring suit against
any of the makers of the notes of the company that he feels
can be collected by suit."
The evidence further shows that friction had devel. .
oped between Knight, Warr, and the defendant, Taylor,
and that is the reason that the collection of all of the notes
was taken away from Moses Taylor and assumed by Knight
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and Warr. The direct responsibility on the collection of
the notes \Vas continued in Knight until 1941 when, because of his absence from the state, the responsibility was
given to Warr.
At Page 46 of the Record Warr states that at the 1934
meeting Elliott Taylor had told them that he had "put all
this cash into the bank" ... "Now I am willing to turn
over my stock." ... "That is all I can now do." In other
words, at the 1934 meeting Elliott Taylor was telling
them, then, he was willing to put in his stock in settlement
of his obligation and that was all that he could do.
On the question of the reliance of the plaintiff corpora. .
tion upon the representations of Moses Taylor that the
stock was held as security and for this reason the statute
of limitations was permitted to expire on the notes, we
call the Court's attention to the Record at Page 47 wherin
Warr states that at the February 26 meeting in 1940,
"From the time we started on, that was our main discus . .
sion is the notes that was getting outlawed and what we
could get settled for and one thing and another of that
kind, and, at no time, at any time note was due and it
hadn't been settled but what them notes all come up-"

Q. And at that meeting you had talked about
foreclosure, hadn't you?
A.

Yes.

Q.

You thought there ought to be some ac . .

A.
Q.

Yes, sir.

tion?
Ot at least a judgment foreclosure, is that

it?
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A.

Yes, talked about foreclosure all along.

Q. The foreclosure, you do remember that,
though?
A.

Yes.

At Pages 50 and 51 Mr. Warr states that the directors,
in 1936, gave to Mr. Knight the responsibility to secure an
attorney and to proceed to bring actions and to collect upon
the three notes; that between 1936 and 1938 the responsi-bility for making the collections on the notes was given to
Mr. Warr, and he, himself, proceeded with the attorney
to secure, by action or otherwise, a collection upon the
Taylor notes. At Page 54 in connection with the collection
on these Taylor notes Mr. Warr says: "I didn't say we
could get cash, but I said we didn't take the stock because
we weren't sure the stock was any good at that time."
At Page 73 Warr states that he left the notes with
Callister, pursuant to the direction from the directors, with
instructions to proceed to foreclose on the notes, and the
matter was left, in 1941, with the specific direction to Cal-lister to bring an action on the notes. At Page 73 Warr
answers the question:

Q. The last action, direction, you gave was
for Mr. Callister to bring an action on these notes?
A.

Yes.

Q. You didn't tell him any different and
haven't at any time, have you?

A.

No.

Q. And you didn't have any contact with
Moses Taylor from 1941 to the 1943 meeting, did
you?
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. A.. I don't remember having any.
At Page 76:
So in spite of the fact that there was col~
lateral you were determined to bring an action,
then, in 1941?

Q.

Well, that was the only way to get it
transferred. Taylor refused to transfer it or show
us it was transferred.
.r\.

Q.

Back in '41?

A.

Yes, or any other time.

In a directors' meeting, February 26, 1940, the direc~
tors determined to accept the stock of Elliott C. Taylor in
settlement of his notes, provided arrangements could be
made with Callister so that the 25 per cent fee agreed
on for collected items would be cancelled, and F. T. Knight
was given full authority to act. At the directors' meeting
held October 14, 1941, the settlement of the Elliott C.
Taylor note for the stock of the Kamas State Bank is re~
ferred to W arr to secure a release of the notes from Callis~
ter and to have the stock settlement accepted provided satis~
factory arrangements can be made with Callister to with~
draw the notes and not have them listed for the payment
of 25 per cent as the amount collected as attorney's fees.
Prior contacts by Callister had been made with Elliott
Taylor in attempting to secure collection, and the plaintiff was advised by Elliott that they could have the stock
or they could have nothing as far as he was concerned.
Warr indicated that he felt all along that he didn't want
to have the plaintiff company take the stock, that instead
he felt they could do better by taking a judgment against
Elliott Taylor and realizing on it later. At no time was any
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agreement secured from Callister that he would return
the Elliott Taylor notes to the plaintiff corporation and
withdraw any claim to attorney's fees if the corporation ac..
cepted the stock in full settlement. At no time had the
board of directors of the plaintiff corporation ever agreed
to accept the stock without the attorney withdrawing his
claim to compensation, and the only directive in this mat..
ter is the minute entry of the board of October 14, 1941,
which provided for W arr to take the stock in settlement if
Callister would withdraw his fee.

In May, 1943, Moses Taylor advised Callister, by let..
ter, being plaintiff's Exhibit B, of the number of shares of
bank stock attached to the Elliott Taylor note and advised
him that he would appreciate his recommendations on the
stock and what claim he was maintaining if the stock was
accepted as settlement of the notes. At page 55 of the Rec..
ord, W arr then states:

Q. You remember a meeting held with the
directors in 1943, don't you?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What month of the year was that held?

A. Well, it was in the midsummer some..
time, but I wouldn't say when.

Q. What would be your best recollection as
to the month?
A.

Well, I'd say it was in June?

Q.

Now, it could have been July?

A.

Yes, I was here three months, then.

At page 59 the testimony was as follows:
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Q.

You remember that meeting in which
there was this altercation between Mr. Knight and
Mr. Moses Taylor? (Referring to 1943 meeting. See
page 58)

A.

Yes .

..t\t page 60:

Q.

Tell me this: At that meeting in which
there was an altercation with Mr. Knight, can you
tell me what Moses Taylor told the Board at that
•
7
orne.
A.

I'm not sure .

..t\t page 61:

Q. Now, going back to this '43 meeting you have stated you have no recollection at all as
to what Moses Taylor said at that time?
A. Appeals back to me - I know what you
want me to say, and I'll say it.
Q. Wait a minute, you mean you have been
refusing to testify because you thqught THE COURT: No, you don't need to lecture
him. He has said now he will answer your question;
let him do it.
A. So many meetings; your question was, was
there anything else said or anything happened, re..ferring to that meeting?
Q. My question was: Do you remember what
Moses Taylor said at the '43 meeting when there
was the fight with Knight?
A. Yes, he said the notes was outla\ved, and
he sent the collateral back to it, to Mr. Taylor, be..cause we didn't foreclose on him.
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Q. Now, you are sure those were the words
that -were used?
A. That's the words he said.
At page 62:

Q. He might have said, then, "Elliott Taylor
is now withdrawing his offer, and the stock is no
longer available"?
A. I didn't say "he is now drawing," I said,
"he had drawn."

Q. He said he had withdrawnA. He had taken his stock; he said, "I sent
them back to the owner." I says-

Q. Tell you that he no longer could make a
settlement because Elliott Taylor wouldn't accept
it?
A.

Then-

Q. All right, what were the words that he
used?
A. He said that, that the notes had outlawed
and that he had sent the stock back to the owner.
Following this meeting, Callister indicates in his tes . .
timony that in July and August he made demand upon
the defendant, Taylor, to turn the stock over to him but
that the defendant refused to do this.
The evidence then shows that nothing was done in this
matter until the annual stockholders meeting held July 1,
1946, at which time the minutes of that meeting, Exhibit 1,
which were signed by Warr and by Moses Taylor, sho\V
that directors were elected, and upon a motion unan~mously
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passed the meeting proceeded as a joint stockholders and
directors' meeting. At this meeting Warr was elected presi. .
dent and Hoyt vice president. The minutes show that a dis . .
cussion was brought up by Warr regarding a claim he felt
the company had against the secretary, Moses C. Taylor,
in reference to his actions on the notes of Elliott C. Taylor,
but no conclusions were reached by the Board.

In explaining this matter, at page 66 of the Record,
King states:
Q. Now, at the '46 meeting you were elected
a director, if I understand?

A.

Yes.

Q. And was there any discussion after your
election to the office of director as to whether the
company should bring a suit against Moses Taylor?
A. Why, yes. It was discussed there for some
time, and it seemed to me that Mr. W arr was highly
in favor of entering suit against Mr~ Taylor for the
collection of these notes, and - well, in fact, I
stated rather positively that I was opposed to it; in
fact, I think I said it seemed to me highly silly to
make a court issue of something that could be de. .
cided right there in the meeting.

Q. Now, did Mr. Warr ask for authority in
that meeting to sue Mr. Taylor?
A. That was the impression I had, yes.
Q.

Was he given authority?

A.

He wasn't.

At page 226 of· the Record the question was asked
Mr. King:
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Q. And has the board of directors of the
Kamas Securities Company at any time authorized
the filing of this action?
A.

None at all.

Q.

This is solely an action of Mr. Warr?

A.

That seems to be the case.

In his testimony, Moses Taylor, who has been presi-dent of the Kamas State Bank and secretary of the Kamas
Securities Company since 1933, and who at the 1946 meeting was made a director of the plaintiff corporation and
continued in office even though the control of this corpora-tion is vested in the Knight family of which W arr and
Frank Knight are members, testifies as to what actually oc-curred in relation to the Elliott Taylor notes and stocks.
At Page 184 of the Record Mr. Taylor states that
Exhibit A, being the note for $2,000.00, was executed in
the fall of 1932. At Page 182 he states that Exhibits B and
C arose out of transactions in 1933 at the time of the bank
holiday. At Page 213 Mr. Taylor further states that the
Exhibits B and C were evidence of the assessment that El-liott would have paid on his stock in the Kamas State Bank.
In other words, as appears from Mr. Moses Taylor's testi-mony, the bank was required to raise $10,000.00 to reopen
which they did by assessment, and though the money was
raised by three of the officers of the bank, including Moses
Taylor, the obligation of each of the stockholders for his
proportionate share was evidenced by notes where the sum
was not paid by the s~ockholder in cash. Mr. Taylor states
that the notes, Exhibits B and C, though they were made
payable to the bank, should have in effect been made pay-able to Moses Taylor who adv~nced the money which was
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to be raised by that assessment. Mr. Taylor states that
this hcu1dling of the notes was careless but that there was
no question that Exhibits B and C \Vere part of the assets
that \Yent into Kamas Securities, the plaintiff corporation .

. .A.s appears at Page 214 of the Record, the transaction
from \vhich Kamas Securities \Vas fortned resulted from the
formation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
which required the liquidation of a number of the assets
of the bank, and those assets being, replaced by cash. The
bank sold these assets to depositors and stockholders and,
for their cash, transferred to them the assets of the bank,
among \Yhich assets were Exhibits A, B and C. These assets
were transferred to the stockholders and depositors of the
bank, and they in turn formed the plaintiff corporation, the
depositors and stockholders transferring to the plaintiff
corporation the various assets in exchange for stocks and
debentures. When these transfers v1ere made, when the
various stockholders secured their stock, does not appear at
any place in the Record. The notes are not endorsed. There
is no record to show which stockholders transferred the
notes to the plaintiff corporation, and the only indication
in the Record as to this matter is contained at Page 214
where, in answer to the question on cross--exatnination, }Ar~
Moses Taylor states:

Q.

The Kamas Securities Company paid for
them the same as they did the other notes, did they
not?

A.

Yes.

Were these notes included among the as~
sets of the Kamas State Bank then?

Q.

A.

No, they v.reren't.
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Q. Well, when you totalled up the amount
of the notes turned over to the Kamas Securities
Company, you had to make the entry of that total,
did you not, in the books of the Kamas State Bank?
A. I don't know whether - I don't think
your question is correct. See, when the notes were
taken out of the assets of the bank, the checks were
secured from the depositors and those entries were
entered that way; later on the securities company
was organized.
In other words, there is nothing in the evidence or in
the entire record \vhich shows that the plaintiff company
ever paid anything of value for the notes, Exhibits A, B and
C, and the inference, of necessity, must be that no consider..ation was paid for these particular notes. They were merely
added to the assets of the plaintiff corporation and were
not in fact, certainly as to two of the notes, Exhibits B and
C, ever the assets of said corporation and vvere never trans..ferred to the bank frotn individuals and then back to the
plaintiff corporation as assets coming from the bank. The
defendant submits, therefore, that there is nothing in th~
Record at any point showing any consideration paid for
the notes, whether they had been transferred, under what
circumstances, what monies were paid for the notes, whe..ther face value or otherwise, or whether any monies, any
stocks, or any debentures were issued by the plaintiff cor..poration for said notes.
In fact, Moses Taylor made clear that the notes B and
C which were actually his personal property were tossed
in as part of the assets going to the plaintiff corporation
for which the defendant never did receive anything of value
whatsoever.
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SPECIFIC~~ TIONS

OF ERROR

1. The court erred in overruling the general demur..rer of the defendant to the amended complaint for the rea..son that said amended complaint does not state a cause of
action and the overruling of the demurrer is contrary to
law.
2. The court erred in overruling the defendant's gen..eral demurrer to the second amended complaint as it ap..pears at page 124 of the transcript for the reason that said
second amended complaint does not state a cause of action,
and the overru4ng of the demurrer is contrary to law.

3. The court erred in its third Finding of Fact where..in it found that on or about the 13th day of February,
A. D. 1934, the Kamas State Bank had in its possession a
certain promissory note payable to the order of the Kan1as
State Bank of Kamas, Utah, one year from the date there..of in the sum of $2,000.00, bearing interest at the rate of
seven per cent per annum, which promissory note had been
executed and delivered by one Elliott C. Taylor, and that
in addition the bank had in its possession on the 13th day
of February, A. D. 1934, t\vo promissory notes of Elliott
C. Taylor, dated the 9th of May, 1933, for $500.00 and
the 9th of May, 1933, for $250000, for the reason that said
finding is contrary to and not supported by the evidence.
4.

The court erred in its fourth Finding of Fact in

this:
A. That it found that the defendant falsely
represented to the plaintiff corporation on the 13th
day of February, 1934, that the Kamas State Bank
held a certain certificate of stock as security for the
payment of three promissory notes, for the reason
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that said finding is contrary to and not supported
by the evidence.
B. That it found that the Kamas State Bank
for a valuable consideration transferred the prolnis..sory notes to the plaintiff corporation by endorse..ment, for the reason that said finding is contrary
to and is not supported by the evidence.
C. That it found that upon the transfer of
the three promissory notes fro1n the Kamas State
Bank to the plaintiff corporation the defendant
stated he was holding 30 shares of stock as security
for the payment of the promissory notes, for the rea..son that said finding is contrary to and is not sup..ported by the evidence.
D. That it found that the plaintiff corporation relied upon the representation of the defendant
and that the defendant represented the certificate
had been endorsed in blank by Elliott Taylor, for
the reason that said finding is contrary to and not
supported by the evidence.
5. The court erred in its seventh Finding of Fact
wherein it found that on various occasions the defendant
represented that the stock was held as security for the var..ious notes and renewals, for the reason that said finding is
contrary to and not supported by the evidence.
6. The court erred in its eighth Finding of Fact in
that it found that the plaintiff corporation relied upon the
false representation of the defendant and feeling itself se..cure permitted the statute of limitations to run against the
various notes, for the reason that said finding is contrary
to and not supported by the evidence.
7. The court erred in its ninth Finding of Fact where..in it found that for the period from the 16th day of June,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

-")';

{

19-+3, to the end of .:-\ugust, 19~1-3, i-\. \\'. "V\/arr \Vas in
c:allfornia, for the reason that said finding is contrary to
the evidence.
8. Ti:~ court erred in its tenth Fnding of Fact vvhere . .
in it found:

i\. That the defendant was acting in col. .
lusion vvith his brother, for the reason that said
finding is contrary to law and is not supported by
the evidence. Further, that there is no issue made
or supporting this finding in the evidence.
B. That the stock was fraudulently, and vvith
intent to Lnjure the plaintiff corporation, and in vio . .
lence of the office of trust, returned by the defend . .
ant to his brother, for the reason that said finding
is contrary to la\v and is not supported by the evi. .
dence.
C. That not until less than two years prior to
the commencement of this action were the other of. .
ficers· of the plaintiff corporation informed of the
return of the stock to Elliott Taylor, for the reason
that said finding is contrary to law and contrary
to the evidence.
D. That not until two years prior to the com-mencement of the action did the officers find that
the representations were false and untrue, for the
reason that said finding is indefinite as to what
statements were made, is not supported by and is
contrary to the evidence, and the truth is that the
plaintiff corporation and its officers at all times
were advised that the stock was held for settlement
only.
9. The court erred in its eleventh Finding of Fact in
that the court found that the stock was of the reasonable
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value of $60.00 per share on the date the stock \Vas returned to Elliott C. Taylor, for the reason that said find..ing is not supported by the evidence, is contrary to law and
could not be a measure of damage under any theory for
which relief is sought by the plaintiff corporation.
10. The court erred in its twelfth Finding of Fact
wherein it found:
A. That the defendant made a gift of ten
shares of stock of the plaintiff corporation each to
Virgil l(ing and Elmo Hoyt, for the. reason that said
finding is surplusage and not supported by any is..sues raised by the pleadings, is contrary to law and
at variance with the pleadings.
B. That Virgil King and Elmo Hoyt did not
own any of the debentures of the corporation, for
the reason that said finding is contrary to and not
supported by any evidence, is immaterial and con..trary to la\v and not supported by any issue, and is
at variance with the pleadings.
11. The court erred in its thirteenth Finding of Fact
wherein it found that said Virgil King and Elmo Hoyt, act. .
ing in collusion \vith said defendant and for the purpose of
protecting said defendant in his fraudulent acts, refused
to act favorably on said request of Mr. W arr, for the reason
that said finding is not supported by the evidence, is con . .
trary to the evidence and is at variance with and not sup . .
ported by any issue raised by the pleadings.
12. The court erred in its fourteenth Finding of Fact
wherein it found:
A. Thai: A. W. Warr, acting for himself in..dividually and for others similarly situated holding
stock and debentures of the plaintiff company,
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brought this suit against the defendant, for the rea. .
son that said finding is contrary to law, is contrary
to and not supported by the evidence, and is out. .
side of any issue raised by the pleadings of the plaintiff. .

B. That the defendant fraudulently deprived
the corporation of assets. That said finding is con . .
trary to law and to the evidence and is not sup . .
ported by any issue.

13. The court erred in its fifteenth Finding of Fact
where in it found:
~~.

That the plaintiff had been damaged in
the sum of $1,800.00, for the reason that said find . .
L.1g is contrary to the evidence and contrary to the
law.
B. That the stock was wrongfully returned by
the defendant to Elliott C. Taylor, for the reason
that said finding is contrary to the evidence and to
the law.
C. That the reasonable market value of the
stock at the time the stock was returned was the
sum of $1 ,800.00, which finding is contrary to the
evidence and to the law and is indefinite for the
reason that the date of the market value is not
found by the court.
14. The court erred in making its Conclusions of
Law wherein it determined:
A. That the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of
the court declaring, ordering and adjudging the de . .
fendant to deliver to the plaintiff 30 shares of stock
in the Kamas State Bank, for the reason that such a
conclusion is contrary to law and is not supported
by the pleadings and is. not supported by the find . .
ings.
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B. That, in case the defendant does not de... liver the stock to plaintiff, plaintiff have and re..cover judg1nent against the defendant for $1 ,800.00,
together \Vith interest at the rate of six per cent from
the first day of Septen1ber, 1944, for the reason that
said conclusion is .contrary to the lavv and is not
supported by the findings.

15. ,_fhe court erred in failing to find fron1 the af,..
firmative defense of the defendant that the action was not
brought by the plaintiff corporation, that such action had
never been authorized by the board of ~irectors and that
such directors had never authorized filing of this action;
that such refusal of the court to so find is contrary to the
law.
16. '"fhat the court erred in failing to make a find . .
ing on the separate defense of the defendant to the effect
that the action of the plaintiff is barred because of the
latches of the plaintiff, it appearing that no action was
brought from the 13th day of February, 1934, until Oc. .
tober 16, 1946, and is barred by the Statute of Limitations.
104. . 2. . 24 U. C. A. 1943.

17.

The court erred in refusing to grant the motion

of the defendant for a new trial, which refusal is contrary to law.

18. The court erred in entering its judgment in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant for 30 shares of
stock or for the sum of $2,259.00 for the reason that said
judgment is not supported by the findings or the con . .
elusions and is contrary to law.

19.

The court erred in entering its judgment in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of
$204.00 as costs of court for the reason that said court costs
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are not supported by any memo of costs as required by law
and such entry of judgment is contrary to law.
20. The court erred in failing to find as requested by
the defendant that on or about 1936 or 1937 Elliott Tay~
lor for\varded to the defendant two certificates of stock
totalling 30 shares of Kamas State Bank for the purpose
of effecting a complete and final settlement of his account
with plai-ntiff, for the reason that said failure to find on this
material fact is contrary to law and the rights of this de~
fendant, and this requested finding is fully supported by
the evidence and there is no evidence to the contrary.

21. The court erred in failing to find as requested by
the defendant that the plaintiff and its officers had been
advised of the fact that Elliott C. Taylor had forwarded the
stock and that the officers were advised that they could
have the stock only if they accepted it in full and complete
settlement and satisfaction of all the indebtedness of Elliott
Taylor to the plaintiff corporation, for the reason that the
failure to so find is contrary to lav1 and this fact is uncon~
troverted and supported by the evidence and is a material
issue to be found by the court.
22. The court erred in failing to find as requested by
the defendant that at no time had the board of directors
of the plaintiff corporation accepted the offer of Elliott Tay~
lor of the shares of stock in full settlement of his indebted~
ness, for the reason that the failure to so find as requested
is contrary to law; that said fact is a material fact and un~
controverted and fully supported in the evidence.
23. The court erred in failing to find that the board
of directors of the plaintiff corporation had refused to ac~
cept the offer of Elliott Taylor to deliver the 30 shares
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of Kamas State Bank stock in full satisfaction of the in..debtedness of Elliott C. Taylor. That said finding is a fact
uncontroverted in the evidence and is a material issue in
this case, particularly in view of the minutes of the corpora..tion represented in Exhibit F, showing a meeting ofFebruary 26, 1940, and a meeting of October 13, 1941, wherein
the board determined that the offer would be accepted only
if the notes could be taken from the attorney and he waive
his claim to 25 per cent.
24. The court erred in overruling the objection of
defendant to the introduction of the testimony of the wit..ness De\Vitz a? to the value of Kamas State Bank stock, as
appears at page 296 of the Record, which ruling is contrary
to law.
25. The court erred in overruling the Special De..murrer of the defendant to the Amended Complaint of
plaintiff and, particularly, the second grounds of said de..murrer wherein the defendant claimed the complaint \Vas
uncertain wherein it alleged: "for a valuable co"nsideration
paid by the plaintiff corporation," for and upon the reason
that defendant was not able to ascertain what, if any, con..sideration was paid by the plaintiff, and the recital of the
court to require the plaintiff to set forth in its complaint
the consideration paid is contrary to law.
26. The court erred in overruling the objection of
the defendant to the testimony of the plaintiff's counsel
Callister to the value of the stock, as the objection appears
at 256 of the Record, for the reason that the ruling of the
court permitting Callister to testify is contrary to law.
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ARGUMENT
The various and numerous assignments of error here . .
tofore set forth will be argued under the following num . .
bered specifications with the argument under these various
subjects to be so organized as to include all of the various
specifications and without waiving any of such specifica. .
tions. The various subjects are as follows:

I.

The court erred in failing to sustain the
general and special demurrers to the various com. .
plaints.
II. The Findings are not supported by the evi. .
dence; the Conclusions are not supported by the
Findings, and the Judgment is not supported by the
Evidence, Findings or Conclusions.

III.

The action on behalf of the plaintiff cor. .
poration is unauthorized and is void and a nullity.

IV.

This action is barred by the statute of
limitations, particularly the provisions of Sections
104-2. . 22 and .104. . 2. .24, U. C. A. 1943, and, fur . .
ther, that the action is barred because of the actions
of the plaintiff.
V. The court erred in its Findings as to the
value of the stock and in giving its judgment based
upon the value found.

VI.

There was no offer of the stock which the
corporation could accept.

VII.

The court erred in entering judgment for

costs.
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I

THE COURT ERRED IN Fi\lLil\IG TO SUSTAit~
THE GENERAL AND SPECIAL DE}.AUP\.RERS TO
THE V ARIOl)S COMPLAINTS.
At all times during the argu1nent on the pleadings,
in the presentation of the case at pretrial and in the trial
of the case, W. D. Callister, attorney for respondent, has
claimed that this action was not one for conversion but was
one for breach of trust as an officer of a corporation. The
final and complete answer to the contention of the respon-dent's counsel is the fact that neither his pleadings nor his
evidence show that the defendant was ever an officer of the
Kamas Securities Company during any of the times com--·
plained of. That this is an actual fact is evidenced by Ar-ticle IX of the Articles of Incorporation of the Kamas Se-curities Company. This article states that:
"The officers of this corporation shall be thre.e
directors, one of whom shall be President, and one
of whor11 shall be Vice--President; also a secretary
and treasurer who may or may not be a stock-holder or director, and vvho shall be appointed or
employed by the Board of Directors. No one shall be
an officer or director who is not a stockholder."
The evidence shows that the defendant was never a
stockholder nor a director of the Kamas Securities Com-pany during the times complained of, and the evidence
shows that the defendant was appointed secretary at the
February 13, 1934, meeting. These facts are mentioned at
this time to show the court that there is substance to our
contention for the general demurrers, for, as a matter of
law and as a matter of fact, there is no relationship of an
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officer to the company, and the evidence itself shows merely
the relationship of an employee \Vith the cotnpany, and,
further shows the employment \vas gratuitous. The only al..legation of the relationship between the defendant and the
plaintiff corporation is contained in paragraph 2 of the
Second Amended Complaint with the bare recital that the
defendant, from the 13th of February, 1934, to the date
of the filing of the complaint \vas the secretary of the plain..tiff corporation. There is no allegation at any other place
in the complaint setting forth the relationship of the de-fendant to the plaintiff, other than the allegation as to his
position as secretary.
If this action could be maintained at all for the breach
of a fiduciary relationship, then the facts setting up that
fiduciary relationship must be made to appear in the com. .
plaint. From the complaint and by the evidence, the defendant was only an employee. There being no such rela. .
tionship in fact and none appearing from the complaint,
the action, if it could be maintained, could be as one only
for fraud. In the case of Kinnear v. Prows, ______ Utah ______ ,
16 P. 2d 1094, the court held that the elements necessary
to constitute actionable fraud are as follows:
"(1) A representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its
materiality; ( 4) speaker's knowledge of its falsity or
ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it should
be acted upon by the person and in the manner rea. .
sonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of
its falsity; (7) his reliance upon its truth; ( 8) his
right to rely thereon; and (9) his consequent and
proximate injury."
Though the plaintiff has claimed that its action is one
for fraud of an officer, there is nothing in this complaint
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to show that he was an officer at the thne any representa. .
tion was made in 1934. The whole basis that the fraud is a
breach of any fiduciary duty is negatived by paragraph 4
of the complaint which states that the defendant was act..ing for the Kamas State Bank. This makes the action ap..pear to be one in which the defendant was acting to de..fraud the plaintiff and to permit the benefit to go to the
bank, and yet such theory is not followed in the pleadings. ·
The use of the word "falsely" is a conclusion only of the
pleader and as used in paragraph 4 and the balance of the
complaint could be construed only as an allegation that
the fact was not true, but it cannot be construed by the use
of the word "false" only as being a willful or fraudulent
representation or lay the basis for a recovery in an action
for fraud. This court has determined that the use of the
vvorld "false" is a conclusion of the pleader and adds noth..ing to the complaint. The pleader is required to set forth
the facts. Particularly does the use of the word "false"
lose all efficacy of willfulness or fraud, because the com-plaint subsequently sets forth the fact that the defendant
did have the stock and complains of the fact that the stock
was returned to Elliott Taylor.
In paragraph 9 of the complaint the plaintiff sets forth
the fact that the corporation was advised by the defendant
that the stock had been· offered by Elliott Taylor in full set-tlement of the three promissory notes. There is no allega-tion in paragraph 9 that the corporation had accepted this
offer. There is no allegation as to how long the offer was to
remain in force. There. is no allegation as to what action
the corporation had taken at the time the offer was presented to it, and, therefore, paragraph 9 loses its efficacy
because there is nothing to show that as far as the offer is
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concerned any relationship had been created which had
been violated in any \vay by the defendant. The fact
is that the complaint shows the statute of limitations had
run on all of the notes by January of 1942. Paragraph 9
states that, as of May 25, 1943, a year and four months
after the statute of limitations had run, the defendant had
advised the other officers and agents that Elliott C. Taylor
had offered the shares, but it doesn't appear, from para. .
graph 9, when the offer was made, or that as of May, 1943,
there was any representation that there was an existing
valid offer from Elliott Taylor, and the statement is only
that, on May 25, 1943, the defendant told them that El. .
liott C. Taylor had offered the stock as settlement. This cer. .
tainly cannot be in any manner construed to allege an offer
of the stock in settlement by Elliott Taylor on May 25,
1943.
Pa~ 1graph

10 of the complaint is a complete contra. .
diction lf all previous allegations because it sets forth that
the clef\ ndant had in his possession the stock and that he
returne l it to the owner, Elliott Taylor, claiming that this
was de .1e fraudulently and with intent to injure the plain..tiff corporation. The use of the words "fraudulently" and
intent to injure the plaintiff corporation" do not add any
effica< r to the complaint unless the complaint sets forth in
its fa, ts that the plaintiff was the owner of the stock or the
retun 1 of the stock breached any right w~ich the plaintiff
had. fhe ·complaint is entirely void of any such allegations,
and there are no facts to show that the corporation had
any right to the stock at the time it was returned. The
plaintiff states the fact to be that it had no rights of secur..ity on the stock, sets up the fact that it knew the stock was
in the possession of the secretary and knew it was in his
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possession for the purpose of settlement. There is no allega. .
tion that the plaintiff was or became the ovvner of the stock.
There is an allegation that the stock at all times belonged to
Elliott Taylor, was his property, and from the complaint the
return of the stock to Elliott Taylor could have violated no
duty.
We sincerely submit to the court that this complaint
does not state a cause of action against Moses Taylor.
As will be more specifically set forth in subsequent ar. .
gu1nent, the court erred in overruling the special demurrer
of the defendant in which the defendant requested the court
to require the plaintiff to set forth in the complaint the
consideration paid for the note. As the action is not one
brought upon the note itself but is one brought upon fraud,
the plaintiff could not in any event recover any greater
sum: together with interest, than paid for the note. This
was an essential part of th~ complaint in setting forth dam. .
ages, and the failure of the court to require the pleading
of that sum, together with the failure of the court to re. .
quire evidence on that matter, was reversible error.

II
THE FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE; THE CONCLUSIONS ARE NOT SUP. .
PORTED BY THE FINDINGS, AND THE JUDGMENT
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, FINDINGS
OR CONCLUSIONS.
The third finding of fact is that the Kamas State Bank
had in its possession on February 13, 1934, three promis. .
sory notes, _which are set forth in the finding.
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The fourth finding of fact is to the effect that the de-fendant, acting in behalf of the Kamas State Bank, of which
he was cashier, falsely represented to the plaintiff that the
Kamas State Bank held the thirty shares of stock of El-liott C. Taylor in the Bank as security for the payment of
the three notes; that the Kamas State Bank, for a valuable
consideration, paid by the plaintiff corporation, transferred
the three promissory notes to the plaintiff corporation by
endorsement.
These findings are not supported by any evidence
whatsoever.
Counsel for plaintiff has always been under the mis-taken belief that the plaintiff corporation purchased cer-tain assets from the Kamas State Bank by paying cash to
the Kamas State Bank. This was not and never has been
the fact. The Bank, in order to qualify for federal deposit
insurance, was required to exchange certain of its assets
for cash. This required the Bank then to find a buyer for
those assets" and this was accomplished by having the de-positors and stockholders buy certain of the assets from the
bank. This policy \Vas followed, and numerous depositors
and stockholders paid in various sums to the Bank, in ex..change for which they received certain assets of the Bank.
The defendant attempted to make that procedure clear to
the attorney for plaintiff on Page 214 of the Record when
he was asked the question:

L'Q. Well, when you totalled up the amount
of notes turned over to the Kamas Securities Com..pany, you had to make the entry of that total, did
you not, in the books of the Kamas State Bank?
A.

I don't know whether-! don't think your
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question is correct. We, when the notes were taken
out of the assets of the bank, the checks were se..cured from the depositors, and those entries were
entered that way; later on, the Securities Company
was organized."
It further appears from the evidence that the assets·
of the plaintiff company approximated $48,000. (R. 184)
The depositors and stockholders, after they had pur..chased the assets of the Kamas State Bank, then determined
they would form the plaintiff corporation.
This would clearly show that the Kamas State Bank
did not at any time receive any consideration from the
plaintiff corporation for any of the assets which eventually
were owned by the Kamas Securities Company, and the
finding that the Kamas State Bank, for a valuable consider..ation, transferred the notes to the plaintiff corporation is
entirely contrary to and is not supported by the evidence.
There is no evidence as to who pur:chased the three promis..sory notes complained of from the Kamas State Bank, and
the evidence is that two of the notes never were property of
the Bank.
The finding that Moses Taylor, the defendant, was act..ing in behalf of the Kamas State Bank, of which he was
cashier, is likewise contrary to the evidence and unsup..ported· for the reason that the only dealings that the Bank
had on its assets were with its stockholders and depositors
to whom it sold its assets for cash, and this was accom..plished before the plaintiff corporation came into existence.
The finding that the Kamas State Bank had made any rep..resentation to the plaintiff corporation by its cashier, the
defendant, is entirely contrary to and not supported by the
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evidence, because for the same reason the evidence shows
there was never any dealing between the plaintiff corpora..tion and the Bank.
The plaintiff corporation dealt with its stockholders
v;ho had purchased assets and which assets the stockholders
were turning over to the plaintiff corporation. This error
is a material one and represents an attempt of the plain..tiff corporation to support its contention that representa..tions were made as to the notes at the February, 1934, meet..ing by tying in the transaction with the bank, which it
would like to claim was selling the assets to the plaintiff
corporation, and that in order for the Bank to make the
sale the defendant made these representations. Clearly the
defendant had nothing to gain personally in the sale of
the assets, and the plaintiff has been attempting to reach
the defendant by connecting hin1 as cashier of the bank.
This is contrary to the actual fact and finds no support
\vhatsoever in the evidence. This finding further represents
that the Court and the plaintiff corporation did not under..stand or appreciate the mechanics under which the plaintiff
corporation got its assets.
As indicated, the fourth finding is to the effect that at
the February, 1934, meeting the defendant falsely repre..sented to the plaintiff corporation that the Bank held se..curity for the notes. In the first place, the evidence shows
that at that time the Bank had qualified for the federal de..posit insurance, had received its cash, and no longer held
the notes - they having been transferred to some depositor
or stockholder, the details of which were not brought out
in the trial. The evidence further is to the effect that nothing
was said about any particular note or asset at the February
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meeting of 1934; that to the contrary the various assets that
had been taken out of the bank were before the meeting in
tabulated form, and nothing was discussed about them ex. .
cept by totals.
The testimony of both Knight and W arr is as follows,
at Page 41 of the Record:

"Q. In other words, there was a general dis.cussion as to how much the assets would be that
would be turned over by the depositors to the cor. .
poration?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Is that it?

A. There was no discussion as I know of; Mr.
Taylor, Moses Taylor, told us just how much we
had and we accepted it.

Q.

There was nothing in detail presented at

A.

No.

all?

Q. · Just lump sum, large figures mentioned?
A.

That's all."

On Page 87 of the Record, Knight admitted that at
the. time of his _deposition he had no recollection of any
discussion prior to 1936. Hovvever, he claims he \vas asked
to refresh his recollection, and though he could not tell
how that was accomplished, he nevertheless states at Pages
91 and 92 of the Record in reference to the 1934 meeting:

"Q. They didn't discuss any particular notes,
did they?
·

A.

No."
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Under the \vell. .established principle of this Court that
the \Vitnesses' testimony would be no stronger than it is left
on cross. .examination, the atten1pt of Knight to recall any
statement at the 1934 meeting can be no stronger than it is
stated above.
We sincerely submit to this Court that there is no evi..dence of any statement as to the notes or securities which
can be discovered in this evidence as regards the 1934 meet..ing. In further support of this, and vve feel it is conclusive,
is the testimony of Knight and W arr as appears at Page
100 of the Record as follows:
'' . . . if you were to get the stock, then you
had to take it as full settlement?"

A.

That was what we were always told."

"THE COURT: There is no dispute about that,
apparently; at least, that is Mr. Warr's testimony,
too."
Further and conclusive on this matter is the state..ment of Knight as appears at Page 121 of his deposition,
wherein he states:
"In what manner this stock of Elliott Taylor's
was held, who held it, and in whose name it was,
whether it was a chattel mortgage on it, a pledge,
an agree1nent, or whether it- was merely held to be
offered in settlement, you never inquired?

A.

No.

Q.

And you never found it, did you?

A. No, I don't believe I ever did because I
had always taken Mr. Taylor's word on it. It was
there and any time we were ready to accept it, it
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would be turned over if we would take it in full set. .
tlement.''
This deposition of Knight's was taken in September,
1948, before the various amendments ~o the complaint
were made, and it is very clear and evident that as far as
Knight was concerned, he had always been told and given
to understand that the stock was there for the purpose of
effecting a final and complete compromise and for that
purpose only, and that the plaintiff corporation could have
the stock only if it took it in full settlement.
Knight and \Varr are the only witnesses for the plain. .
tiff on the matter of any representations of the defendant
prior to the employment of Mr. Callister as counsel in
1936. It is interesting to note, too, that Mr. Callister re . .
ceived his first knowledge of there being any stock involved
in 1940 in a conversation with Elliott Taylor, and though
Mr. Callister had been collecting on the notes and making
investigatio~s on them for four years, he had never been
advised of any security or any representations as to any
security. This even though the Statute of Limitations had
run on two of the notes prior to the time Mr. Callister
was advised as to the stock.
We submit that the evidence will not permit any find . .
ing of any representation made in 1934, and will not per. .
mit any finding that the bank transferred the assets to the
plaintiff, or that the defendant acted in behalf of the
plaintiff.
As to the seventh Finding of Fact wherein the court
finds that the defendant represented falsely that the stock
\vas held as security for the various notes and renewals, it
is submitted that the records, as in this brief elsewhere
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pointed out, disclose that both Knight and Warr knew "all
along that there \vas only one way they could get the stock
and that was to accept it in full settlement." Assuming for
the purpose of argument that their statement was correct
that the defendant told them the stock was held as security,
the fact remains that they knew also that there was only
one \vay they could get the stock and that vvas to take it in
full settlement. That destroys entirely any claim that the
corporation was misled or ariy of the directors were misled
by any statement of Mr. Taylor. There was no misunder..standing in the minds of Knight or Warr as to the manner
in which the stock was held and the purpose for which it
was held. It is submitted that these people have never been
misled at any time by any statement of Taylor, for he has
constantly told them that the stock was available for them
only if they would take it in full settlement. The corpora..tion never accepted this proposition, and we submit that
any finding as to such representation was not supported by
the evidence.
Particularly is the Finding, that the defendant, on the
25th of May, 1943, represented that the stock was held
by him as security, contrary to the evidence, because the
Finding is based, as far as the evidence is concerned, upon
the letter of that date, and there is nothing in that letter
which would support any such finding. In fact the letter is
clearly to the contrary because it states that the corporation
should talk with Elliott about making a compromise.
Finding No. 8 of the court, that the plaintiff corpora..tion relied upon the false representations of the defendant
and feeling itself secure permitted the statute of limitations
to run, is so contrary to the evidence as to make it appear
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ridiculous. Warr, who had the complete authority, as presi~
dent of the company, to settle the Taylor notes, states in
his examination that, as pointed out elsewhere in this brief,
he instructed Callister to bring an action on the notes in
1941 and had never told Callister otherv1ise. Both Knight
and W arr testified that they never knew and never dis~
cussed the date of the notes or the fact that the statute of
limitations had run upon them. The fact is, by Warr's
statement, they had determined that they would not rely
upon the stock but had instructed their attorney to. bring
action. The Finding is entirely fallacious, because there was
no knowledge or infor1nation on the part of the plaintiff
corporation other than that there could have been no pledge
of the stock because they could only get it, and it was avail~
able to them, only if taken in full settlement. This was not
a pledge relationship, there vv-as no information or no
reason, in January of 1942, for the corporation to rely upon
any pledge, and assuming there was a pledge they could
not reach the stock if the statute of limitations had run
against the notes. Under our statute there is only one way
in which the plaintiff could have realized upon the stock
and that \vas to bring an action to foreclose. It could have
been forced to bring this action whether it proceeded in
any event by sale. If the plaintiff corporat~on could not sup~
port its sale of the stock by an action in the courts for fore~
closure because its action would have been barred on the
notes, then there was _no remedy to plaintiff and it could
not have held or have any claims to the stock. The finding
of the court on this matter was entirely error.
The ninth Finding of Fact, that A. W. Warr was in
California from the 16th of June, 1943, to the end of
August, 1943, is entirely contrary to the evidence, for the
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\Vitness Warr stated in his cross . .examination that the meet. .
ing in 1943 was held in midsummer, that it was his best
recollection it \vas held in June or July, and his testimony
can be left no stronger that it was on his cross . . examination.
The attempt of the court to make such a finding is entirely
contrary to the evidence.
The tenth Finding of the court, that the returning of
the stock by the defendant was fraudulent and with intent
to injure the corporation and in violation of the office of
trust, is entirely contrary to the law and the evidence. There
was no evidence to show that the corporation had any right
to the stock. As a matter of la\v, the corporation had no
right to d1e stock. Elliott Taylor was the owner of the stock,
and in 1943 when the stock was returned by the defendant
to Elliott Taylor, Elliott Taylor was the owner and en . .
titled to the possession of the stock. The returning of the
stock to him was certainly neither collusive nor fraudulent
and could not be held so because, as a matter of fact, he
v1as legally entitled to the possession of it.
The tenth Finding, that the other officers of the plain. .
tiff corporation were not informed of the return of the
stock to Elliott Taylor for less than two years prior to the
commencement of this action, is grossly error because Judge
Crockett will have to be bound by the uncontradicted evi..dence that at a meeting of the directors held in the summer
of 1943 the directors Knight and Warr were advised by the
defendant that this stock had been sent to Elliott Taylor.
This matter is more completely argued elsewhere in this
brief.
The court erred in its twelth Finding of Fact wherein
it found that the defendant had made a gift of shares of
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stock to King and Hoyt and that King and Hoyt acted
in collusion with the defendant for the purpose of protect..ing the defendant in his fraudulent acts and refused to act
favorably on the request of W arr, for the reason that such
finding is entirely contrary to law and to any issue in this
case, and is entirely unsupported by the evidence. The plain..tiff has never amended its complaint, and any issue of this
kind is not made a part of its complaint, and, though the
defendant had set up in his answer that the action had not
been brought by the corporation as there was no authority
for the acts of Warr, the plaintiff in its reply merely denied
that affirmative matter. There is no issue before the court
on any other matter than the question as to whether W arr
had been authorized to file the action as the president of
the corporation. The question of fraud or collusion in pre..venting him from bringing the action was never made an
issue in this case. This finding not being supported by any
issue and such issue never having been before the court,
the attempt of the court to make a new issue out of that
and incorporate it in the Findings without the foundation
appearing in the pleadings and without the defendant ever
being apprised of the purpose or the issue maintained is
entirely contrary to law.
. The thirteenth Finding of Fact wherein the court
found that King and Hoyt acted in collusion for the pur..pose of preventing the favorable action on the request of
W arr is likewise void for the same reason.
The fourteenth Finding that W arr brought this action
for himself individually and others similarly situated, was
entirely erroneous and is elsewhere in this brief more spe..cifically argued and set forth. The attempt of the court to
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make a finding of this kind when it is not supported in
any manner vvhatsoever by the pleadings or the evidenct
\'.'as gross error.
The attempt of the court in its Conclusions of La\v
to direct the defendant to deliver 30 shares of stock to the
Kamas State Bank or, in the alternative, to pay a sum as
cash is obviously contrary to lavv and is error for the reason
that this action was never conceived to be one for replevin
but is one for fraud for a false representation. There is no
claim of any owriership of the stock by the corporation. In
fact, Callister in his testimony stated directly to the court
that they made no claim to ovvnership and that the repre . .
sentation of the defendant as to the pledge was false. If it
was false, then the corporation, of course, did not own the
~oc~
·
The court erred in refusing to find, as requested by
the defendant, that the stock \Vas sent to the defendant in
1936 or 1937 by Elliott Taylor for the purpose of effect. .
ing a complete and final settlen1ent of the account. This is
an important and essenti~_l fact in this case, and the failure
of the court to so find as requested is contrary to la\v. The
failure of the court to find, as requested by the defendant,
that at no time had the plaintiff corporation accepted the
offer of Elliott Taylor to give the shares of stock in full set--tlement of his indebtedness, is error, ·for on this fact the
evidence is uncontradicted. It is a material fact, and any at..tempt to hold the defendant unless such offer had been ac--cepted by the Board was grossly error.
Like\vise, the refusal of the court to find that the
Board of Directors had refused to accept the offer of set. .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

so
tlement \vas gross error as such request is supported by the
uncontradicted evidence in the case.
The court erred in overruling the special dernurrer of
the defendant v1herein the defendant had re~}Jcsted the
court to require the plaintiff to specify vlhat consideration
had been paid for the notes. This r.oatter is n1ore fully ar-gued elsewhere, and we submit that the entire b2-.sis for the
recovery of any damages vvould require that the plaintiff
plead and prove the consideration paid for the notes.
We submit that Judge Crockett was grossly in c;_Tor in
overruling th~ objection of the defen:J8.nt to the perraiui:1g
of Callister to testify to the value of the bank stock. De-fendant's objection and the ruling of the court appear at
page 256 of the Record.
. Callister's qualifications were that of an attorney \Vi th
no experience in accounting, and the court perrnitted him
to testify that the stock had a value of $116.00 a share,
which figure was arrived at by dividing the capital stock
of the corporation into a net figure vvhich- Callister had re-ceived by telephone fron1 Mr. Knapp, the state bank coro-missioner, and he in turn had reportedly taken the informa-tion from a bank statement of the Kamas State Bank in Mr.
Knapp's office. This matter is more fully argued elsewhere
in this brief, and we submit that the court committed gross
error in permitting Calllster to glve testimony as to the
value of the stock.
In conclusion on the defendant's objections to the
various assignrnents of error directed to the findings of
the court, \Ve would like to point out that at page 155 of
the Record plaintiff's counsel Callister stated in answer to
Judge Crockett's question:
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"Tl-IE COURT:

\Veren't you interested in
Y.:hcther or not there \vas a chattel rnortgage or
ot:hcr pl~dge of this stock?

_-\.
\~,.-~:.3 ~:z1y

no infonr:~1tion to the effect there
such. so of course there \vas no interest

I

h~:d

1

tncre.
\\le subn.iit that nothing could be n1ore conclusive of
fall~1cy

of all of Callister's clain1s as to letting the statute
of lin1itations go by and of reliance upon any pledge or
r::.o;.·tgJ.ge than his O\vn adrniss~on to Judge Crockett that

.c-\t page 163 of the Record Callister states that he
\vent to see Taylor in 1943 at the request of l(njght, and
the court \vill notice in the Record that Knight was the
one who had the fight with Taylor at the 1943 rneeting
when told that the stock had been sent back to Elliott Tay..lor. This definitely ties in the time \vhen the co1·poration
had notice of the return of the stock. i\t page 165 Calllster
-states there had never been any agreement as to his fee and
he had never agreed to waive his fee, nor did he, and -vve
subrnit this as conclusive of the fact that the condition upon
which the offer of settlement might have been accepted was
never 1net and is conclusive of the fact that the corpora..tion never accepted the offer.
At page 175 Callister admits that when the defendant
told him he would have to talk with Elliott he asked him
why he would have to talk with Elliott. Defendant refused~
to answer and yet Callister never followed that matter up.
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III

THE ACTION ON BEHALF OF TI-IE PLAINTIFF
CORPORATION WAS UNAUTHORIZED AND IS
VOID AND A NULLITY.
Defendant's Exhibit 1, minutes of the 1neeting of the
stockholders and directors of plaintiff corporation, held
July 1, 1946, shows the annual meeting of the stockholders
of plaintiff corporation to have been held in Kamas, Utah,
July 1, 1946. The stockholders at that meeting adopted an
amendment to the Articles increasing the directors from
three to five, which vvas done on motion of A. W. Warr.
Upon motion, the five directors, being Knight, Hoyt, King,
W arr and ,...faylor, vvere unanir.nously elected as directors.
The minutes further recite that all of the above named
directors being present, the meeting was then continued
as a joint stockholders' and directors' meeting. Officers
vvere elected and following this, Arthur \\1 arr presented
to the meeting the claim he felt the Company had against
}Aoses C. Taylor in reference to his action on the notes of
Elliott E. Taylor. The minutes further recite that no conclusions ·were reached by the Board. In his testimony at
Page 65 of the Record appears the following:

"Q.

No question about the fact before all
stockholders and directors at that meeting, some
rnention about the Taylor claim?

A.

Yes.

Q. But there was no conclusions rendered, no
action taken by the Board of Directors, was there?
A.

Not at that time, no, because we broke
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up in a row again. We didn't get a chance to finish.
There was no objections or sanctions.

Q.

No authority given anyone; nothing done?

A.

No; nothing done."

At Page 66 of the Record W arr further states that no
other action on this matter was ever taken by the Board
of Directors, there being one subsequent directors' meeting
in June of 1948, and that no authorization to file or con~
tinue this action was given at that time.
On Page 224 of the Record the witness Virgil A. King,
one of the directors, states that at the 1946 meeting he
was elected a director, and further states:
"It was discussed there for sometime and it
seemed to me that Mr. Warr was highly in favor of
entering suit against Mr. Taylor for the collection of
these notes, and I stated rather positively that I was
opposed to it; in fact, I think I said it seemed to me
highly silly to make a court issue of something that
could be decided right there in the meeting.

Q.

Now, did Mr. Warr ask for authority
in that meeting to sue Mr. Taylor.?
A.

That was the impression I had; yes.

Q.

Was he given authority?

A.

He was not."

The evidence stands uncontroverted that A. W. Warr,
as president and director of the plaintiff corporation, at a
directors' meeting asked authority to bring an action against
Moses Taylor on the matter of the Elliott Taylor notes;
and it further stands uncontroverted in the evidence that
the directors refused to give that authority to the president,
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and, in fact, denied him that authority. The matter then
having been submitted to the board of directors of the
plaintiff corporation, and they having determined not to
bring such an action, the question remains as to whether
under those circumstances the president can sue in the
name of the corporation and contrary to the determination
of the Board bring such an action. In other words, can
the president of the corporation act separately and apart
from and contrary to the express desire and determina. .
tion of the board of directors?
We would like also to call the Court's attention to
the minutes of the plaintiff corporation from the time of
its incorporation, being plaintiff's Exhibit F, and to point
out that in every instance where an action was to be <::om. .
menced on any of the notes or obligations due the corpora. .
tion, the authority for that action has always been first pre. .
sented to the board and the authority taken only where the
board has specifically granted that authority.
In support of this we call the Court's attention to the
minutes of the meetings of February 15, 1935, .June 20,
1935, August 26, 1935, November 18, 1935, all of which
are instances in which the board itself considered and acted
upon any settlement on any obligation and authorized the
secretary and other officers to take action whenever any
legal action was contemplated.
The minutes of February 10, 1936, permitted F. T.
Knight to employ an attorney to make arrangements for
the -collection of all notes owned by the company. And
again, on November 23, 1936, on the report of Knight to
the Company, he was authorized to employ the attorney
on a percentage basis.
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Throughout all of the subsequent minutes relative to
the settlement of notes and other matters, these questions
have been referred to and handled by the Board of Direc..tors. This company not being an active company, but merely
one for the collection of notes, necessarily the authority of
its officers is limited, and they have no designated duties
except as given them by the board of directors, and the
board of directors on all matters has reserved its complete
authority and the officers have only such authority and
such duties as would be delegated to them by this board,
and have no general authority or right to act either by rea..son of the delegation of authority by the directors or by its
By..-la\\rs or Articles of Incorporation.
By--law No. 6, which is a part of Exhibit F, provides
that a board of three directors is to manage the affairs of
the company. It also provides that the directors shall have
the general management and control of the business af-fairs of the company, and shall exercise all the powers that
may be exercised or performed by the corporation. The only
authority given to the president by the By-la\vs, which is
By--law ~Jo. 7, is that the president shall preside at all rneet-ings of the stockholders.
Section 18--2--20, U. C. PL 1943, provides that the cor..porate affairs of the corporation shall be exercised by the
board of directors, and in construing this section the Su-preme Court of the State of Utah, in the case of Anderson
et al vs. Grantsville North \Villow Irrigation Co., 51 Utah
137, 169 Pac. 168, has held that the authority to manage
and control the corporation and conduct its business is left
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holders, and the action of the board of directors shall su. .
persede even that of the stockholders.
In construing this statute, likewise in the case of Cop . .
per King Mining Co. v. Hansen, 62 Utah 605, 176 Pac.
623, this Court has held that where authority is given a
president to act as the agent of the company in selling treas. .
ury stock, and at a subsesquent meeting, without reference
to that authority the board of directors has made other provisions, the authority of the president has been rescinded
by implication. Clearly, therefore, any authority which
Warr may have hoped to have had as president of his cor. .
poration would definitely have been terminated and with. .
drawn by the refusal of the board of directors to give him
authority to file the action against Taylor in the 1946 meet. .
in g.
In the Copper King case, supra, and in the case of
Lochivitz v. Pine Tree Mining & Milling Co., 37 Utah
349, 108 Pac. 1128, our Court has held that the president
as such has only the power of a director plus such powers
as the board ofdirectors has conferred upon him.
It is worthy of note, too, in the Grantsville North Wil . .
low case, supra, this Court has held that where the direc. .
tors of a corporation refused to authorize the transfer of
shares of stock, the president and secretary did not have
authority to make a transfer, even though there was a reso. .
lution of the stockholders vesting the officers with such
power.
Legion against Vivisection, Inc., et al v. Grey, 63 N.Y.
Sup. (2d) 920 { 1946), was an action for libel brought by
the corporation as plaintiff against four individuals as de . .
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fendants. The Court, in dismissing a judgment in favor of
the corporation and against the individuals, said as follovvs:
"Another compelling reason exists for setting
aside the verdict of the jury and for dismissing the
second cause of action. The record is not entirely .
devoid of proof ~stablishing the authority to prose-cute the action on behalf of the corporate plaintiff.
There is not a scintilla of evidence to show that the
institution of the action in the corporation's behalf
was authorized, or that such action was later rati-fied by proper resolution of the Board of Directors.
On the contrary, it would seem that the corporate
action was instituted by the individual plaintiff
upon his own volition, without the consent or au-thority of the representative members of the corporation. Such proof is vital, particularly where the
controversy is one between ranking members of the
corporation concerning the administration of the
corporate affairs.
"Defendant's motions are granted to the extent
of setting aside the verdict as to the second and fifth
causes of action, and the same are dismissed on the
law."
9 Fletcher Cyc. Corporations, Sec. 4216,

~tates:

"Sui_ts by corporations must be instituted and
defenses made as other acts by corporations must
be done by proper authority. The proper persons to
authorize the commencement of a suit or the inter-position of a defens~ on behalf of the corporation
are primarily the directors, but the power may be
vested in the president or other managing officer.
:t. :t. :t. An officer of a corporation merely as such
has no power to bring any suit his fancy may dic-tate."
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Again, in Paragraph 4219 of the same volume, it is
stated:
"The general control of actions resides in the
directors. Incident to the control over suits would be
tqe authority tq make compromises which may be
in the dire~tors or by the manager or officer within
the limits of the delegated authority."
Another case that is even stronger is the case of St.
Bernard Trappers Association v. Michel, 162 L. A. 366,
110 So. 617. In this case the company made an assignment
of a lease through its treasurer. Subsequently, a mass meet. .
ing was held of some 800 trappers and members of the as. .
sociation and they repudiated the assignment and directed
that a suit be brought to declare it null and void. The presi. .
dent of the association then employed counsel and com. .
menced an action and resigned from his position the fol . .
lowing day. A Board of Directors' meeting held after this
resignation r,epudiated this action of the president and em. .
ployed counsel to dismiss the action. The motion to dismiss
was denied by the trial court.
"The primary question presented for decision
arises on the motion to dismiss, which motion wa~
filed at the instance and on behalf of the Board of
Directors of plaintiff corporation, and this, of
course, involves the question as to whether or not a
suit instituted by the president of a corporation can
be thereafter continued and prosecuted to judgment
by such president and intervening stockholders of
the corporation, against the will and over the pro . .
test of the said Board of Directors, who are charged
under the charter and under the law with the man . .
agement of the affairs of the corporation."
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The statute in Louisiana authorizes the president of
a corporation to bring an action for the corporation. The
court, hovvever, in this case stated that the purpose of this
statute is to avoid the necessity of a special resolution to
that effect and to prevent technical objections to want of
authority. This court in reversing the trial court and dismissing this suit then goes on to say:
"It is perfectly manifest that it was never the
intention of the law maker to. confer on the presi . .
dent ofr a corporation the authority to institute and
prosecute a suit in opposition to the wishes and
against the protest of the Board of Directors of the
corporation, and more especially was it not the in . .
tention to authorize such president to seek by judi. .
cial process the undoing of the acts of the corpora. .
tion legally passed by the Board of Directors in the
exercise of the powers· and direction vested in said
Board by its charter or by the law."
Thus, in this case we have a statute authorizing the
president of the corporation to bring an action on behalf
of the corporation but the court decided that where the
Board of Directors had the managerial powers of the
corporation its actions are determinative.
It is also important to note that this is not a stock. .
holder's action. A stockholder's action requires the stock. .
holder to have a derivative right and to have asked the cor. .
poration to sue where the right of action is in the corpora..tion in the first instance and the stockholder has been de..nied such right. When such action is brought by the stock..holder, it is brought in his name and should be brought
in behalf of those other stockholders similarly situated. The
pleadings of the case make it obvious that the action was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

GO
an action by the corporation and not the stockholder;s
action.
"All or any number of the stockholders may,
in a proper case, unite in bringing a suit in behalf
of the corporation. But if all are not joined as plain . .
tiffs by name, the suit should be brought in behalf
of those joined and all other stockholders similarly
situated, and the fact that it is so brought should be
alleged in the complaint. Stockholders who do not
join as ·plaintiffs are proper though not necessary
parties defendant.
"The corporation must be made a party where
the action, though in the name of the stockholder,
is in reality brought for its benefit." Bancroft Code
Pleadings, Vol. 2, Sec. 1213.
In the file is a letter of Judge Crockett's under date of
May 13, 1949, in which he indicates his doubt as to the
president of the corporation having authority to bring
this action. Judge Crockett states in that letter that in his
own opinion,
"The suit actually is a stockholders' suit
brought in right of the corporation against the sec. .
retary and managing officer.''
The judge further states in this letter that he feels that
our court's determination in In Re Rice's Estate, 111 Utah
______ , 182 P. 2d 111, vvould permit the court to proceed to
handle this as a stockholders' case. In this we feel that
Judge Crockett is entirely in error. In the proceeding in
the Rice case the court held the petition stated a cause of
action, that all of the parties necessary in that action were
before the court, that whether the court heard the matter
in the probate division or the civil division, or whether
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the file was entitled in the civil or the probate division,
\vould be immaterial in view of the general jurisdiction of
our district courts.
The court in its Finding No. 14 has attempted to lay
the foundation for the application of the decision of the
court in In Re Rice's Estate, supra, for the court has found
that A. W. Warr, as president of the plaintiff corpora. .
tion, acting for the benefit of the corporation and also
acting for himself individually and for others similarly
situated, holding stock and debentures of said Kamas Se. .
curities Company, brought this suit against the defen...
dant. The court has attempted to avoid the fact that the
action was one of the corporation by converting it into a
stockholders' suit. We submit that an action by a corpora. .
tion and an action by a stockholder in a derivative suit are
two entirely separate types of action.
Vol. 13 of the Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations,
Perm. Ed., Para. 6006 states:
"The facts which entitle a stockholder to sue
in place of a corporation must be alleged. This in . .
eludes the facts to show that he is a stockholder and
such a stockholder as is authorized to sue and that
the corporation itself has either refused or unreason. .
ably failed to bring the action."
That the complaint must contain an allegation that
the plaintiff is a stockholder at the time of the commence. .
ment of the suit and of the time when he demanded that
the suit be brought is clearly established by Fry v. Rush, 63
Kansas 429, 65 P. 2d 701.
In paragraph 6007, Fletcher, in his work supra, points
out that the federal rule specifically sets forth that the
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plaintiff must allege he was a shareholder at the time of
the transaction of which he complains. It is further pointed
out in paragraph 6008 of the work by Fletcher, supra:
"The complaint must show that a proper de-mand on the directors, or corporate officers, or
stockholders, or on both, has been made and expressly or impliedly refused, or must show that such
a demand would be useless. This rule is well settled
and admits of no exceptions. Such allegations con-stitute a part of the cause of action to show the
right of the plaintiff as a stockholder to sue."
The complaint has never been amended, nor has
leave to amend ever been asked by the plaintiff. ~t stands
as an action com1nenced by the plaintiff corporation to re-cover against the defendant for fraud perpetrated upon the
corporation. Without the allegations sufficient to permit
the action to be a stockholders' derivative suit, and without
a stockholder a party to and bringing the action, the court
cannot determine the action to be a stockholders' action.
The court, too, is under the misapprehension that all of the
parties necessary for this acdon vvere before the court. This
is not so, because the corporation itself was not n1ade a
party to the action, and this is necessarily so. If there was
no authority to bring the action in the name of the cor-poration by W arr as president, then the entire proccc.:::Hng
is a nullity and no action was before the court. W arr as an
individual or as a stockholder was not before the court as a
party. The pleadings do not set this forth, and, if Warr is
not a party to the proceeding as an individual or stock-holder and the allegations in connection with a derivative
suit are not made to appear by the con1plaint, this pro-ceeding could not be further maintained by him.
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Conclusive on this tnatter is the following quotation
from the case of Gaines v. Gaines Bros. Co., 56 P. 2d 863,
\vherein the court states at page 867:
" 'The rule is that shareholders cannot, ordin. .
arily, sue in equity to redress wrongs done to the
corporation. The ordinary remedy for such injuries
is to be sought primarily through corporate action.
But if the directors are guilty of a breach of trust,
injurious to the corporate assets, or to the rights of
the shareholders or some of them, and if the cor. .
poration refuses to institute proper proceedings to
restrain or redress such injuries, one or more of the
shareholders may proceed in their individual names.
In such case, however, it is necessary that the peri...
tion contain averments sufficient to create an excep. .
tion to the general rule, and to establish in peti. .
tioners the right to thus proceed.' See Cassidy et al
v. Rose et al, 108 Okl. 282, 236 P. 591."
The Answer of the defendant affirmatively set forth
the issue that the action was not one commenced by the
plaintiff corporation, that there had been no authority
granted for commencing the action, and that A. \XI. Warr
specifically had no authority to file the action in the name
of the plaintiff corporation. To this affirmative issue the
plaintiff corporation filed a reply denying all of the affir1na. .
ti ve allegations of the Answer. The issue raised by the
Answer required more than a general denial and required
that the plaintiff corporation set forth .facts \Vhich would
substantiate the authority to bring the action in the name
of the corporation. This was not done, and on the plead. .
ings themselves the court should have granted the motion
of the defendant to dismiss the action. Certainly, under
these issues, Judge Crockett could not arbitrarily determine
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in his mind that he would make this a stockholders' suit.
The fact that A. W. Warr appears in the action as a wit-ness does not make him a party to the action. We submit
that Judge Crockett was entirely in error in attempting
to convert this action into a stockholders' suit.
The attempt of Judge Crockett to extend the prin-ciple announced by this court in In Re Rice's Estate to the
facts in the instant case was grossly error. The corpora-tion must be a party to the action, and apparently Judge
Crocket thought that it became immaterial whether that
was accomplished by the corporation bringing the action
itself or whether the action was brought in behalf of the
corporation by a stockholder. The inability of Judge C~ock.
ett to apply that principle in this case comes from the
fact that once the fact is established that the president
of the corporation neither by statute, articles, by--laws, or
explicit or implied authority by the board of directors, had
authority to file the action in the name of the corporation,
then the corporation was not before the court.
W arr as a stockholder was not a party to this action.
It is much like a tort action in which "A" is charged for
negligence in the driving of an automobile. "B" appears as
a witness in behalf of "A", and the court, without amend-ment to the pleadings or otherwise, grants judgment
against "B".
We submit that the district court had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of this action, if any there was, but it
did not have jurisdiction over any party, and the attempt
to apply the Rise case doctrine or extend it to such a situa-tion as this is certainly a fallacy.
·
Conclusive of this is the statement of the court at page
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116 in the Pacific citation of the Rice case wherein the
court states:
"If \Ye keep in mind the fact that there is no
separate probate court in this state and that the
district court has original jurisdiction in matters
not excepted by the Constitution, we realize the
question is not so much one of jurisdiction as it is_
one of procedure."
At page 115 of that case the court points out that the
executrix and trustee had appeared generally, and so th~
court was not without power to proceed.
We submit that the Rice case could not apply in this
instance because the corporation had never appeared and
the Rice case is one of procedure and not of jurisdiction
of the parties.
At page 16 of the Utah Report of Trip v. Third Dis,
trict Court, 89 Utah 8, 56 P. 2d 1355, our court sets out
the requirements of a complaint in a stockholders' deriva-tive suit as the showing of a stockholders' position as such
plus a demand upon the corporate authorities and a re-fusal.
IV
THIS ACTION IS BARRED BY Tl-IE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS, PARTICULARLY THE PROVIS-IONS OF SECTIONS 104--2--22 AND 104--2--24, U. C. A.
1943, AND, FURTHER, THAT THE ACTION IS
BARRED BECAUSE OF THE LATCHES OF THE
PLAINTIFF.
If any characterization can be given the action brought
by the plaintiff, it would be one for fraud. In the
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original complaint in paragraph 8 the plaintiff states that
the defendant in collusion with his brother Elliott fraudu . .
lently and with intent to injure the plaintiff corporation,
and in violation of his office of trust as secretary, returned
the stock to Elliott. In the amended complaint the plaintiff
characterizes all of the statements of the defendant rela. .
tive to his holding the stock as security as being false. It
must be assumed, therefore, that the plaintiff has not at
any ti.me maintained that the stock was held as security,
but it is a fact that it was not - this because he charac..terizes the representation as false that any stock was held
as security. The plaintiff has stated at the trial and in the
argument of the demurrers that this action was not one
for conversion but had to do with the responsibility of an
officer to a corporation. That this is so is evidenced by
the court's determination of the issues at the time of trial.
Again in paragraph 10 of the amended complaint the plain..tiff characterizes the return of the stock by the defendant
as being done in collusion with Elliott Taylor, fraudulently,
and with intent to injure the plaintiff corporation, and in
violation of the office of trust, and alleges further in said
paragraph 10 that the plaintiff had no knowledge of such
acts for less than two years prior to the filing of the action
- this undoubtedly because of the three . .year statute in
connection with the limitations on actions for fraud.
We desire to point out at this time that the defen..dant's answer to the second amended complaint affirma..tively sets up that the action is barred by the provisions of
104. .2. .24, U. C. A. 1943, and sets up the affirmative de. .
fense of latches in that no action was commenced from the
13th day of February, 1934, and to this answer the plain. .
tiff filed only a general denial by reply and set no affirma. .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

67
tive issue to relieve it from the bar of the statute of limita. .
tions. Under the authority of Clatvson v. Boston Acme
l\1ines Development Company, 72 Utah 137, 269 P. 147,
there could be no issue raised by plaintiff under the issues
in this case other than the fact that the period for the
statute of limitations had not expired. This action, there . .
fore, being one for fraud in either falsely representing a
fact to the corporation or fraudulently and by collusion
with intent to injure the corporation returning the stock,
· would be barred within three years from the time the
plaintiff corporation had knowledge of the facts constitut. .
ing the fraud. In this connection we would like to point out
to the court that the record is clear that there was only
one directors' meeting in 1943.
In his cross..-examination Warr was asked:

"Q.

Do you remember a meeting held with the
directors in 1943?

A.
Q.

Yes.
What month of that year was that held?

A. Well, it was in the midsummer sometime,
but I wouldn't say when.

Q.

What would be your best recollection as
to the month?
A.

Well, I'd say it was in June.

Knight, who was an officer and director, in his cross. .
examination at page 266, states that he had a recollection
of the 1943 meeting at the time he assaulted Moses Tay..lor. Moses Taylor in his testimony at page 190 gives the
date of the meeting as June or July, 1943. At page 61 of
the Record, in speaking of what took place that this meet. .
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ing in 1943, the witness Warr after dodging the matter for
considerable time and frankly admitting that he knew what
counsel was trying to get at says that at that meeting
Moses Taylor told the board of directors of the plaintiff
corporation that the notes were outlawed and he had sent
the collateral back to Elliott Taylor because the directors
didn't foreclose on Elliott.
Again, at page 62, Warr states that Moses Taylor told
them at that meeting in reference to the shares of stock,
"I sent them back to the owner." At page 63 Warr states
that Moses Taylor told them the stock wasn't there at the
bank and that it had been sent back to the owner, Elliott.
The Finding of Fact No. 10, that not until within two
years of the commence1nent of this action did the plaintiff
corporation discover that the said representations of the
defendant that he had returned the stock were 'false and
untrue, is entirely contrary and unsupported by the evi. .
dence.
A well established principle by our court is repre . .
sented in paragraph 189 of 54 C. J. S. where it states:
"Knowledge by the defrauded person of facts
which in the exercise of proper diligence would en . .
able him to learn of the fraud ordinarily is equi. .
valent to discovery of the fraud." ·
As indicated above, when the defendant told the di . .
rectors at the meeting in the midsummer, June or July of
1943, that he had returned the stock to Elliott Taylor, ad . .
vising them that he no longer had it and what he had done
with it, there could have been no other knowledge or no
other fact which could have brought home so vividly to
the officers of the corporation the fact that the defendanr
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no longer had the stock, and, if they had any claim on the
stock or for any redress in connection therewith, they were
on knowledge at that time and moment of all the facts
\vhich could ever be disclosed to direct them to proceed
\Vith atiy action they felt they might have. The evidence
shows that they never got any further or better knowledge
of any fact at any later date different than the fact that
the stock had been returned. There was no other further
knowledge necessary. They were completely advised of all
facts necessary to put them on complete notice when they
were told at that meeting that the stock had been returned.
It is fundamental that knowledge of all of the facts is neces..sarily knowledge of the fraud.
It is further submitted that notice of facts sufficient
to put the other officers on inquiry as to all of the facts
appears from the testimony of Callister hims~lf. At page
129 of the Record, Callister stated that sometime the latter
part of June or the first part of July, 1943 - he did not
remember the exact date - he called the defendant by
phone and asked him to transfer the stock, and at that
time the defendant told him he wanted to see Elliott about
it first. At page 130 of the Record, Callister stated that he
went up to see the defendant at his home in Kamas, Utah,
in July or August of 1943, and again told him to transfer
the stock, and at that time the defendant again told him
he wanted to see Elliott about it first. Callister states he
asked him why he should see Elliott, and the defendant
gave him no answer. Callister had done nothing on this
matter, as far as the evidence and the Record discloses, as
far as the collection of the notes was concerned, for several
years prior to his sudden burst of activity in the summer of
1943. This was the time when the fight between the de..Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fendant and Knight took place at the directors' meeting
and would certainly account for the attempts on the part
of Callister to have the stock transferred. Undoubtedly he
was advised of the directors' meeting.
Also, at page 131 of the Record, Callister indicates.
that he had no knowledge in 1943 of the minutes of the
1941 meeting, so definitely the condition that he, Callis. .
ter, had to waive his fee if the stock was accepted had
never been met because Callister, in the Record, indicates
he has never \Vaived,. and he didn't intend to waive, his fee
on that matter.
The Record is complete with the consultations between
Callister, Knight and Warr during 1943 and during the
summer of 1943, and the combination of all of these fac . .
tors is certainly strong enough to assure the fact that the
various officers in the corporation were put on notice of
all facts in connection with this stock, its return, and the
conditions upon which it had been held by Taylor.
It is perhaps well at this time to call the court's atten . .
ion to the fact that the defendant's advice to Callister, that
he \vould have to see Elliott first, is further support of his
letter of May 25 to the effect that any compromise at that
time would have to be worked out by Elliott. The entire
record is conclusive of the fact that all of the directors at
the meeting in the midsummer of 1943 were advised that
there was no longer any opportunity for them to get the
stock, and as this action was not commenced until October
16, 1946, there had been more than three years elapse
since the directors and the plaintiff had complete know} . .
edge, and this action was barred by the statute of limita. .
tions.
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Where or how the court attempts to make a finding
that the plaintiff corporation had no knowledge of this
fact for less than t\vo years is so far beyond comprehen. .
sion as to indicate a con1plete disregard for the evidence by
the court. The Record shows the meeting of 1943 in the
summertime by all of the witnesses, and it shows no other
contact, no other directors' meetings arid nothing done
on this matter whatsoever between the time of that meet. .
ing and the occasion of Mr. Callister's visit to the de . .
fendant at Kamas, Utah, in the summer of 1946.
It is submitted that the knowledge of the facts suffi. .
cient to inform this plaintiff corporation and its officers
that there never was a pledge, that there never was any se. .
curity - chattel mortgage or otherwise - as to the stock,
occurred from the very beginning of the transaction. We
have elsewhere in this brief pointed out the testimony of
both Knight and Warr and the comment of Judge Crockett
that they were both unanimous in it that from all times
and from the very beginning both Knight and Warr knew
that there was only one way the corporation could get the
stock and that was if it would take it in full settlement.
Such knov;ledge on their part, certainly from 1936, if not
1934, is knovvledge of a fact so contrary to the claimed
security relationship that it must be held that they had
knowledge of this fact from the very beginning. This ad . .
mission of Knight and Warr, if not conclusive of the fact
that they were misstating and misquoting the defendant as
to any matter of security, is certainly an admission of facts
sufficient to cause the statute of limitations to have run
against any claitn on their part that they thought there
was a security relationship in connection with the stock.
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Certainly, the direction to Callister by W arr in 1941
to bring suit on all the Taylor notes and his refusal to ac..cept the offer of settlement is conclusive of knowledge on
his part, then, that there was no security arrangement, that
there was no reliance on the statute of limitations, or, if
the stock had security, to let the statute run, particularly
in view of his testimony and that of Knight's that they
never did know what the dates of the notes were.
The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to estab. .
lish that the action was not barred by the application of
the statute of limitations and the plaintiff has not sustained
that burden. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake Investment Co.,
43 Utah 181, 134 P. 603.
It may be that this action partakes of the nature of
one in equity because of the claimed fiduciary relation be..tween the defendant and the plaintiff corporation. We cer..tainly claim that none such has been set out by the plead. .
ings or by the evidence, but, if plaintiff's counsel's hopes
can be maintained, it would be, we assume, in the nature
of an action in equity.
It is submitted that, therefore, the claim of latches in
this matter is a complete bar to any hope of recovery the
plaintiff might have. The Record shows that in 1936 these
notes were taken away from the secretary and placed in
the hands of Knight and he employed Callister to see that
collection was received. The plaintiff corporation permitted
12 years to elapse before taking any action of any kind in
this matter. In 1936 Callister made an investigation reveal..ing that Elliott Taylor had no assets and advised the com..pany that he had none, that it should bring an action to
preserve its rights and to prevent the statute of limitations
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from running. The corporation chose to ignore his advice
until 1941 \vhen the president claims he directed plaintiff's
attorney to bring such an action and, further, the presi-dent states he never gave any advice to Callister other than
to commence action on the notes. Callister, as attorney for
the plaintiff, has prepared pleadings in which he claimed
they relied upon the security and didn't bring the action,
letting the statute of limitations run. We submit that there
is no evidence to support this, and the evidence is entirely
contrary as indicated above, and the fact was at that time,
according to Warr, the stock had no value, and he had
determined he wouldn't accept it in full settlement. The
plaintiff corporation then proceeded to let the statute of
limitations rtin on the notes, and we submit that by that
action they have precluded any hope of recovery on any
basis they might conjure up, because, as a matter of law
and by the statutes of our state, they had no right, legally
or otherwise, to rely upon the fact that they could still hold
the stock even though they could not sue upon the notes.
Knight, Callister and W arr all indicate that they never
knew what the relationship was, whether collateral, whe-ther mortgage, pledge, or offer of settlement, as has been
pointed out elsewhere in this brief.
We submit that the law is well established that where
no relationship at all is given as to security it will be pre-sumed to be a chattel mortgage if anything. But it is our
contention that it matters not whether it be a chattel mort-gage or a pledge. The law is still to the effect that, if the
plaintiff corporation had no ·right of action upon the notes
because of the statute of limitations, it had no further claim
nor any right as to the stock. Any claim to any right of
possession under such a mistaken belief in fact and law is
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entirely fallacious. By their own latches and carelessness,
if they have any claim, if they had any right in the notes,
they would lose that by their own careless acts, and they
no longer had any claim to the stock, assuming that they
did at any time.
Letting this matter pend an additional period of time
from January, 1942, when the last of the notes became out..lawed, until this action was brought in October, 1946, is
a further indication of the entire lack of good faith and dili..gence which a court of equity would require of any plain..tiff.
The argument we have submitted above on the matter
of latches and the false principles of the plaintiff, that it
was still entitled to the stock after the limitations had run
on the note, we desire to likewise apply in our contention
that the Judgment and Conclusions in favor of the plaintiff
were contrary to law.
In the case of Bainbridge v. Stoner, a California case,
106 P. 2d 423, the court held that in an action to hold an
officer of a corporation liable under a constructive trust for
property fraudulently acquired from the corporation the
action, though one in equity, was nevertheless controlled by
the three..-year limitation for fraud actions, and at page 4 27
the court states:
"No repudiation of a constructive trust is ne..cessary to set the statute of limitations in motion. A
cause of action in favor of the corporation and its
stockholders arose when Stoner acquired the prop..erty of the corporation, and the statute commenced
to run against the appellants at least as soon as they
knew, or should have known, what he had done."
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The court then proceeds to hold that the statute of
limitations began to run by implied notice through the ad~
vertisements in the sale of the corporate property under
the judgment for foreclosure. At page 428 the court states:
"The word discovery as used in the statute is
not synonymous with knowledge. And the court
must determine as a matter of law when, under the
facts pleaded, there was a discovery by the plaintiff,
in the legal sense of that term. Consequently, an
averment of lack of knowledge within the statutory
period is not sufficient; a plaintiff must also show
that he had no means of knowledge or notice which
followed by inquiry would have shown the circum~
stances upon which the cause of action is founded.
Moreover, he must also show when and how the
facts concerning the fraud became. known to him."
The court in this case holds as a fatal defect in the
plaintiff's pleadings its failure to set forth the manner
in which it acquired knowledge of the fraud. Applying this
to the principle case, we submit that the plaintiff here by
its pleadings, if not by its entire case, failed to allege a rna~
terial and essential part to protect it against defendant's
motion to dismiss.
We sincerely urge upon the court that by the entire
case and by the pleadings this action was barred by the
statute of limitations, and the court erred in failing to so
hold.

v
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING AS TO
THE VALUE OF THE STOCK AND IN GIVING ITS
JUDGMENT BASED UPON THE VALUE FOUND.
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In its eleventh Finding the court found that the stock
was of the reasonable value of $60.00 per share on the date
the stock was returned, which date the court had previously
found was during the forepart of 1944. The plaintiff had
attempted by various means to establish a value for the
stock in the trial at Coalville. It called as its witness the
defendant Moses Taylor to establish that value, and at
page 249 of the Record the court asked Mr. Taylor if the
stock had a market value in June of 1943, and he answered,
"No, it did not." He always advised the court that there
had been no transfer or sales at or about that time, nor had
there been any for a period of ten years prior to 1943. Fur..ther, Mr. Taylor advised the court that if the stock had
been offered for sale in 1943 there would have been no pur-chaser. In fact, after going through the matter of the credits
and debits of the bank, plaintiff's counsel asked Taylor this
question:

"Q. How was it with such a statement like
that that they didn't close you up?"
So that with the statement as to the bank's debits and
credits as late as of 1943 counsel for plaintiff, himself, was
surprised that the bank had not been closed.
Counsel for plaintiff introduced evidence of his per..sonal analysis of a purported set of figures given to him over
the phone by the bank commissioner which the court states
at page 283 of the Record left it somewhat doubtful about
the value of the evidence concerning the value of the stock,
and so for this purpose the court permitted a continuance
to allow the plaintiff to introduce evidence as to value. Sub.sequentiy, plaintiff produced a Herbert DeWitz, an invest-ment salesman for J. A. Hogle and Company, who intro-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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duced testimony as to the value of the stock. DeWitz stated
that he had examined some balance sheets at the State Capi. .
tol for a period from the end of 1940 through 1943, but he
does not state whose or what balance sheets he investigated
\vhile at the State Capitol. He then states that he investi. .
gated the First Security Corporation, an active trader on
bank stocks and "more active than any other local bank
stocks." (R. 289) Objection was made to the introduction
of any of this testimony, as appears at page 290 of the Rec . .
ord. The court attempted to qualify DeWitz, as appears at
page 291 of the Record, and he is shown to be a gradu. .
ate of a university and a salesman of stocks.
At page 291 the witness states that the only knowledge
he has of the assets or liabilities of the bank is from the
records that are required by law to be filed with the State
Bank Examiner. As appears at 293, the witness states that
if he was to make an examination under a hypothetical in . .
stance given him by the court it would have to be through
book value, through earnings records, dividend records,
and weighing against similar securities.
Also at 293 appears the fact that part of the informa. .
tion the witness would require was not available to him
from the examination of the records at the State Capitol.
In voir dire the witness, at 294, states that his entire esti. .
mate as to value is based upon a comparison of the First
Security Bank stock and the records at the State Capitol.
The witness stated .he didn't know who the management
of the Kamas State Bank was, that he didn't know whether
the stock was closely held, and admitted that this informa. .
tion should be taken into consideration in determining
value of the stock.
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At 295 the witness also testifies that the matter as to
the manner in which the stock is held is a factor in deter-mining value. At 296 the matter of dividends and operat. .
ing expenses was found to be an important factor in deter-mining value, and, at the same page, after this examination,
objection was again made by the defendant to the introduc-tion of any testimony of the witness DeWitz.
Subsequently, the witness DeWitz sets up a formula
which he had prepared by taking the record of the First
Security Corporation and by making a comparison be-tween its book value and its market value, then applied that
same formula to the stock of the Kamas State Bank.
The evidence shows that the First Security Corpora-tion is one of the largest in the intermountain v1est with
capital surplus, undivided profits and contingent reserves
of $9,705,894.00; that its operations extend into at least
two states; that its stock is widely held; that it is an active
trader, dealt in daily, with its value quoted on the market
and listed in each daily paper.
The witness DeWitz further states at pages 310 and
311 that he has never before gone to the bank commis-sioner and taken his figures on an annual report as a basis
for giving a client a figure for the purchases of stock.
At page 314 of the Record DeWitz states that in order
for him to determine the market value of the Kamas State
Bank for any given year he would have to know the value·
of the First Security Bank Stock.
At page 316 of the Record DeWitz states that the First
Security Bank is the largest bank in the state and the
Kamas State Bank is one of the smallest.
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It is submitted that there is no competent evidence
from \vhich the court could have found the value of the
stock to be $60.00 per share, for the reason that the at..tempted analysis of a bank statement by Callister is no
competent evidence. The testimony of Taylor for the plain..tiff \vas to the effect the stock had no value, and the testi..mony of De\Vitz becomes incompetent because his testi..mony is based purely upon a comparison of stock values
which is contrary to law and is actually a situation which
he, himself, had never before used, nor is it shown to be a
practice which is used in advising or determining the values
of stock.
In the case of Patterson v. Plumber, 86 N. W. 111,
the plaintiff sought to recover damage for the breach
of an alleged contract to sell and transfer stock. The agreed
price of the stock in the contract was $135.00, and for his
damages on the breach the plaintiff sought to. show the
value of the bank stock, introducing in evidence the bank's
report to the comptroller general. In this case plaintiff had
the cashier of the bank identify the report and what it con..tained and introduced the report in evidence. In holding
that the court could not use this report by itself. to show
the value of the stock, the court states:
"The claim that this report is competent evi..dence to establish the value of the bank stock on
the date of the alleged contract is necessarily based
upon two propositions: First, that the report itself
proves the value of the property owned by the bank;
second, that each shareholder in said bank was en..titled to one five..-hundredth part of such property,
or its value, for each share owned. :to ¥- ¥- It is ap..parent that, if either of thes.e propositiot;-s are not
sustained, this theory of prov1ng value whtch we are
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considering must fall. ¥- ~ ¥- If there is no evidence
as to the property owned by this banking corpora. .
tion, or evidence of the value of such property, it
matters not that each share is entitled to its pro . .
portion, no value of the property having been
shown. ¥ ¥ ~ The proposition that a holder of
stock in a national bank is absolutely entitled to any
of the property of the corporation is not correct.
:(. :(. :(. The report of the cashier to the comptroller
is not evidence of the value either of the property or
the stock. It does not purport to give an estimate of
the value of either. :(. :(. :(. It is also apparent that
the sum deduced from such reports as book value
are purely arbitrary, and have no reference to actual
value. This can be seen at once by considering that
the actual value of the stock would necessarily rise
or fall with changes in the actual value of the prop. .
erty of the corporation, but the book value would
not change. :(. :t- :(. It is sufficient to say that it
did not furnish evidence of the value to the assets
or data /rom which the actual value of the stock
could be deduced."
In this case the court announces the general rule that,
''The fact that shares of stock have no known
market value will not prevent recovery where the
actual value is ascertainable in an action to recover
damages. The value may be shown by showing the
value of the property and business of the corpora. .
tion."
In the principal case the court denied recovery for
the reason that the plaintiff had relied solely upon the
cashier's report as a matter from which the court could
find value. This value the plaintiff in the action had hoped
to show by dividing the number of shares into the net
value of the corporation, which, of course, the court re . .
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fuses. In this same case the court announces that evidence
could be submitted of witnesses properly informed on the
subject. To be properly informed would be to have the
\vitness informed as to the value of the property and the
business of the corporation, as indicated by the court in
its opinion.
We submit that, the witness DeWitz having testified
that he was not familiar with the management, with the
dividend record, with the properties and with the distri~
bution of stock, and upon his admission that these were
all matters to be taken into consideration in determining
values, any testimony he gave would be incompetent as he
would not be advised or in a position to testify. We submit,
further, that the attempt on the part of DeWitz to give
a value to the Kamas Securities stock by working out a
formula for the First Security Bank stock and applying it
to the other stock is likewise contrary to law and is no basis
upon which a witness can testify as to values. If such were
permitted, any individual could select a stock and make a
comparison as to book records and set up a value. Certainly
does this become a dangerous practice in the use of the wit-ness DeWitz's testimony, for he stated that without knowl-edge as to the value of the First Security stock he could not
testify as to the value of the Kamas State B~nk stock. This
court will surely not permit, as a standard of determining
values of the stock of a small closely held country bank, the
taking of the stock of the largest bank in the state, which
is freely traded upon the market, and which large bank
stock is listed in the newspaper and has a known market
value and whose stock is traded in daily, and the setting up
of a formula based upon its earnings and market price and
apply that to the small country bank to determine the value
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

82

of the stock of that country bank. Certainly, the fact that
DeWitz is employed in a stock brokerage house and he is
not acquainted with even the locality in which the Kamas
Bank is located and knows nothing of its business, makes
him no more qualified by his occupation than any other
person. Unless he goes into the books of the company, ap . .
praises its property, and familiarizes himself with similar
types of operations, he cannot give any testimony concern. .
ing value.
We desire to submit, further, to the court that Judge
Crockett and counsel for plaintiff were entirely in error in
attempting to set a value of the stock as of 1944 in order
to determine the basis of the damage suffered by the plain. .
tiff, if any. Counsel for plaintiff has prepared his case and
submitted his findings upon the basis that there was a false
representation made in 1934 and that in reliance upon that
false representation the plaintiff paid out a valuable con. .
sideration.
For any such act as that which occurred in 1934 the
damage of the plaintiff would be only the amount that it
paid in reliance upon the representation. Surely it could
not receive damages for anything in excess of that. There
is nothing in the findings to indicate what the plaintiff cor. .
poration paid for the notes for from all that appears in
the record and in the findings the plaintiff paid nothing
whatsoever. If it paid nothing for the notes, it hasn't been
damaged in any particular and, in any event, it has only
been damaged to the amount that the plaintiff corporation
put out for the notes. This rule is clearly established and
appears in Vol. 27 C. J., Para. 239, as follows:
"The general rule applicable to the measure of
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damages for fraud is that such an amount should be
a\\'"arded to plaintiff as \Vill compensate him for the
loss occasioned by the fraud, or as it has been ex..pressed, plaintiff is entitled to recover damages ade..quate to the injury which he has sustained. Plaintiff
can recover the entire amount of his loss occasioned
by the fraud, but the recovery must be limited to the
actual loss. The nun1ber of false representations
made does not affect the measure of damages."
In the case of Crews v .Dabney, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 278, an
action for fraudulently misrepresenting the situation of the
maker of a note, the amount of the note was not the meas..ure of damages but was the amount which the plaintiff paid
for the note with interest thereon.
In the case of Kinnear v. Prows, ______ Utah ______ , 16 P.
2d 1094, our court held that:
"The measure of the damages sustained by the
purchaser where a purchase has been induced by
fraud is, according to the weight of authority, the
difference between the real value of the property
purchased, and the value which it would have had
had the representations been true.''
In the case of Hecht v. Metzler, 14 Utah 408, 48 P.
3 7, this court held:
"In such actions as an action for fraud and the
sale of chattels it has usually been held that the
measure of damages is the difference in value be..tween the land as it would have been if as repre..sented and as it actually was at the time of sale."
and further:
"In case of sales where there is a fraudulently
false representation of quantity, quality or title, the
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measure of damages is the difference in value be . .
tvveen that which is actual and that vvhich is repre..sented to exist."
There is no allegation in the complaint as to the value
of the stock in 1934, at the time the purported transfer
to the plaintiff company took place.
It is submitted that the court erred in awarding as
damages and as the measure of damages the value of the
stock as of September, 1944, an arbitrary date selected by
the court, as the date the stock was returned to Elliott
Taylor.

VI
THERE WAS NO OFFER OF THE STOCK
\VHICH THE CORPORATION COULD ACCEPT.
Once again, we desire to point out to the court that
this action was not one for conversion. The court in its
judgment and conclusions has determined, nevertheless,
that the plaintiff Kamas Securities Company is avvarded a
judg1nent against the defendant for 30 shares of stock in the
Kamas State Bank or in the alternative for $2,259 .00. The
judgment for the return of the stock could only be sub..stantiated by an action based on conversion. Yet the com..plaint contains the allegation, always, that the representa..tion that the stock was held as security was false, so neces..sarily this admits that the stock held by Moses Taylor was
not held by the corporation as security.
Findings Nos. 9 and 9 (a) are to the effect that the
defendant had in his possession 30 shares of the Kamas
State Bank stock, which belonged to Elliott Taylor, for the
purpose of using the stock in effecting a complete and final
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settlement of the Elliott Taylor account, and the stock was
t9 be delivered to the corporation only upon the corpora-tion accepting the stock in full and complete settlement.
There is no finding by the court that the plaintiff corpo;a. .
tion had ever accepted this offer. The finding is that Callis-ter and Frank T. Knight had directed the defendant to
transfer the stock, the finding being that these individuals
told the secretary to accept the stock in full satisfaction.
The Minutes for the meeting of October 13, 1941, and
those for February 26, 1940, both provide that the settle-ment of the Elliott Taylor notes for the stock of the Kamas
State Bank in full settlement "will be accepted provid~d
satisfactory arrangements can be made with the attorney
to withdraw the notes and not have them listed in payment
of the 25 per cent.''
The Minutes of 1940 provide that it would be accepted
only if the 25 per cent is to be cancelled.
No authority is given by the Board of Directors to
accept this transfer in full.satisfaction except as the attor-ney's fees of Mr. Callister were to be cancelled. The Finding
No. 9 that June 16, 1943, the defendant was instructed to
transfer the stock is not supported by the evidence because
the letter of Mr. Callister, Exhibit G, of June 16, 1943,
which was supposed to represent that dire-ction, is to the
effect that Callister and Knight had determined the only
. thing to do was to transfer the stock and nothing is men-tioned that the transfer was to be in complete settlement.
As to Callister's fees on this matter, he states he would
have to take that up with Frank Knight and Warr later.
So that the conditions upon which the offer of full settle-ment by the corporation were attached by the Board of
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Directors, that the fee was to be cancelled, had not been
determined in June of 1943 at the time the letter was sent.
There is nothing in the evidence to shov:1 that any a~ree..
ment had been made or arrived at at any time bet\veen
Callister and Knight and W arr as to what his fee \Vould be
in the matter, and certainly there is no evidence of any ar--rangement that would be satisfactory to Knight or Warr
or, what is more important, should have been satisfactory
to the Board of Directors, as the Board had indicated the
fee would have to be cancelled entirely to be satisfactory.
Taking the plaintiff's position, then, at its best and
considering that there \Vas an offer to deliver the stock in
full settlement, there never had been a valid acceptance
of that by the corporation, and, certainly, Moses Taylor,
the Secretary of the plaintiff corporation, with knowledge
of the conditions for full settlement which had been at--tached by the Board, could not proceed to make the transfer
in fairness to Elliott Taylor unless the transfer could be
approved by the Board of Directors or the Board of Direc--tors had taken action approving it. What we think is more
important and decisive of this matter is the fact that the
last reported offer of the stock in full settlement appears in
the Minutes of the directors' meeting of October 13, 1941,
at which time the· Board of Directors did not accept the
offer. The acceptance of it was made conditional, and there
is nothing to show that any offer of the stock was made
subsequent to October 13, 1941. The letter of May 25,
1943, of Moses Taylor to Mr. Callister states in part as
follows:
"It might also be a good idea to give Elliott a
chance of making a compromise settlement on the
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note and that he might be in a position to discuss
this \Vith the Company."
This clearly indicates that as of May 25, 1943, the
matter of transferring the stock in full settlement was a
matter that would have to be negotiated, then, with Elliott
Taylor, and there is nothing in that letter that does not
clearly indicate that the transfer as of that date would have
to have the approval of Elliott Taylor. Again, in this letter,
Moses Taylor indicates the conditions that the Board had
made in previous meetings as to the claim of Mr. Callister,
for he asks him to advise him of the claim he is going to
make if the stock were to be accepted in full settlement.
The condition, therefore, of the offer to transfer the stock
in full settlement shows that it had been made to the cor..poration in the 1941 directors' meeting; that the corpora..tion had refused to accept it unless conditions could be
made satisfactory to the corporation between it and its at..torney. The settlement, according to the 1941 minutes, was
given to A. W. W arr, and he was to secure a release of
the notes from Callister. No authority was given to Knight
to make this settlement in 1941. If the settlement vvas to be
rnade, W arr was to withdraw the notes from Callister and
not have them listed for the payment of the 25 per cent
as the amount collected as attorney's fees. This stands, then,
as an offer that has been rejected by the plaintiff corpora..tion, and certainly the passage of time of a year and a half
is more than a reasonable time to accept any offer in any
event.
We submit that the action of the Board in the 1941
meeting constituted a rejection of the offer as far as Elliott
Taylor was concerned unless he gave authority to renew
that offer, and none appears in the evidence, nor does any
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renewal of the offer appear in the evidence by anyone pur..porting to act in behalf of Elliott Taylor. Then there was
no offer which the corporation could accept. The direc..tion of Callister and Knight to Moses Taylor to transfer the
stock had no authoritative effect whatsoever because there
was no offer which the corporation could have accepted,
the conditions had not been met and they had no authority
to act for the corporation as that was in A. W. Warr.
The failure of Moses Taylor to make the transfer gave no
cause of action to the plaintiff, nor was the plaintiff dam...
aged in any way, because it had no right to the stock and
no offer which it could accept. In returning the- stock to El...
liott Taylor the defendant did nothing other than what he
was legally bound to do because Elliott Taylor was the
owner of the stock and, his offer having been rejected and
there being no renewal of the offer and no acceptance of
any purported renewal, then Elliott Taylor was the rightful
owner and the stock should have been returned to him.
Arthur W. Warr, who was given the authority tone..gotiate for such settlement by the directors in their 1941
meeting, states that the offer to take the stock in full settle. .
ment came up in 1936 and he said he wouldn't take the
stock "because we weren't sure the stock was any good at
that time."
Again at page 72 of the Record and subsequent pages
W arr states that in 1941 he gave the notes to Callister for
Callister to bring .suit upon them, and the last direction and
the last action he took was to give to Mr. Callister all of the
Taylor notes, not only those of Elliott but all of the Taylor
family notes, to bring an action on the entire group, and
Mr. Warr states at page 74 of the Record that he never
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at any time told Callister to do other than to proceed with
his action on all of the notes including those involved in
this action.
It is interesting to take the exact words from the tran . .
script on this point where they appear at page 73:

"Q.

And that is the last action, direction, you
gave \vas for Mr. Callister to bring an action on
these notes?

A.

Yes.

Q. You didn't tell him any different and
haven't at any time have you?

A.
Q.

No.

A.

I don't remember having any."

And you didn't have any contact with
Moses Taylor from 1941 to the 1943 meeting, did
you?

Again, at page 75, Mr. W arr testifies:

"Q.

Why, then, did you tell Mr. Callister to
sue in 1941?
A. Well, there was other Taylor notes besides
the Elliott Taylor, and I wanted him to bunch the
whole bunch up.

Q. You wanted him to sue allA. Yes, if we had got the judgment against
them, that would also include the collateral or se. .
curity we was holding, whatever you might call it,
and we would have the whole thing.
Q. So, in spite of the fact that there was col. .
lateral, you were determined to bring an action,
then, in '41?
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A. Well, it was the only way to get it trans..ferred; Taylor refused to transfer it and show us it
was transferred.

Q.

Back "in '41?

A.

Yes, or any other time."

This testimony shows clearly that as far as W arr was
concerned the corporation had definitely determined not to
accept the offer in full settlement, and he had given instruc..tions to the attorney to bring an action and to foreclose
on whatever security there might be. It further shows clearly
the fact that as early as 1941 all of these officers were ad . .
vised of the fact that they could get the security only if it
was accepted in full settlement.
The Restatement of the Law, A. L. I., Contracts, para. .
graph 35, is to the effect that an offer may be terminated:
A.

By rejection by the offeree.

B.

Lapse of time.

C.

Revocation by the offeree.

Paragraph 36 provides that an offer is rejected when
the offeror is justified in inferring from the conditions or
conduct of the offeree that the offeree intends not to accept
the offer or to take it under further advisement. It further
provides that a communication from the offeree to the of. .
feror stating in effect that the offeree declines to accept the
offer is a rejection. Here, the ·determination of W arr and
his instructions to the attorney to bring suit on the notes
and to get the stock by such action certainly amounts to a
rejection of any offer. The recital of the minutes, that the
offer would be accepted only if the attorney waived his
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fees, and \vhen we find that the attorney has not waived his
fees, \Vould certainly amount to a rejection.
If this \Vere not sufficient, the Restatement provides
in Paragraph 40 that if no specified time for the acceptance
of the offer is n1entioned then the offer expires at the end
of a reasonable time. As to what is a reasonable time is a
question of fact depending upon the nature of the con..tract proposed. Certainly, the expiration of more than a
year and a half is an unreasonable time. The plaintiff cor..poration could not proceed to let time go by as it did in this
instance and then change its position and expect the offer
to be determined as being still in full force and effect. A
reasonable time in this instance \.vould be adequately ful..filled within the time it would take W arr to contact the
attorney and give an answer and this could certainly have
been done in less time than a year and a half.
It is submitted that the failure of the court to make a
finding as to \vhat was a reasonable time is fatal in this
case. In this connection the Finding No. 9 states that on
numerous occasions between the 26th of February, 1940,
and the 25th of May, 1943, and on the 13th of October,
1941, the defendant represented that Elliott Taylor had
offered the 30 shares of stock in full settlement. Other than
the dates in 1940 and 1941 which are the dates of the meet..ings of the directors the only other offer w'Ould be the letter
of May 25, 1943, of Moses Taylor, which certainly could
not be construed to be an offer, because the letter of May 25
states that it might be a good idea to give Elliott a chance to
make a compromise settlement on the note and he might be
in a position to discuss this with the Company. There is
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strueJ to be an offer or rene\val of the offer to accept the
notes in full settlement. Particularly is it necessary to con..strue the letter of May 25, 1943, because the second para..graph of the letter refers to Aaron C. Taylor's note with
five shares of Kamas State Bank Stock, and follo\ving this
is the statement:
"I talked with Frank Knight after your tele..phone conversation suggesting he give us authority
to have this stock transferred in settlement of the
notes and that it might also be a good idea to give
Elliott a chance of making a compromise settlement
on the note and that he might be in a position to
discuss this with the Company."
The transfer of the stock in settlement of the note re..fers to Aaron C. Taylor's stock in the note and it indicates
that as to Elliott it would be well for the Company to dis..cuss with him his note and stock. Certainly there is nothing
in the letter of May 25, 1943, which would be construed
an offer or a renewal of an offer.
\Ve submit, therefore, that the evidence is clear that
the 30 shares of stock belong to Elliott Taylor; that there is
no offer or acceptance of offer; there is no security, nor was
there any right in the plaintiff corporation to hold the stock,
nor was there any obligation on the defendant other than
to return the stock to its rightful owner.
VII

'THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
FOR COSTS.
In paragraph 2 of the Judgment the court awards to
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cember 9, 1948, plaintiff's counsel served upon defendant
proposed Findings and the proposed Judgment. The first
Findings served by the plaintiff are not in the file. To these
Findings the defendant, on the 15th day of December, filed
objections, and on the 3rd day of January, 1949, the plain~
tiff served upon defendant amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law without the defendant ever having ap~
peared or argued the objections submitted. On the 6th day
of January, 1949, the court signed the Judgment which was
filed by the clerk the 17th day of January, 1949.
The memorandum of costs was served on counsel for
the defendant the 9th day of December, 1948, about a
month and a half prior to the time judgment was entered.
There was no stipulation or understanding whatsoever in
connection with the said memorandum, and it is submitted
that, under the provisions of the statutes of this state, a
memorandum of costs not having been served after the
judgment was entered, the said memorandum was fatally
defective and would not support the awarding of the judg. .
ment including costs, the entry of costs in this matter being
a function of the clerk to be entered after the judgment was
signed and filed by the judge. The awarding, therefore, of
costs by the judge in his Judgment being contrary to law,
we submit that the court erred in entering a Judgment for
costs.
Conclusive of error of the court in this matter is the
case of Houghton v. Barton, 49 Utah 611, 164 P. 471. In
that case the court states:
"Costs being unknown at common law, statu~
tes authorizing them are strictly construed :t. ¥- :t. :t.
one of the con9,itions imposed by statute in this state
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in a case of this kind where the entry of the judg~
ment is not stayed is that the cost bill must be de~
livered to the clerk and a copy served upon the ad~
verse party within five days after the notice of the
decision of the court. In the case at bar this was not
done, but on the contrary the cost bill was filed and
served, as stated, eight days before there was a de-cision or judgment in the case. This was not a sub-stantial compliance with the requirements of the sta-tute. The cause, however, is remanded with direc~
tions to the lower court to modify the judgment by
disallowing the cost taxed the respondent."
CONCLUSION
In conclusion we submit to this Honorable Court that,
inasmuch as the defendant was not a director, was not even
a stockholder, and was only a gratuitous employee, there is
no foundation in the complaint or by the evidence to make
a cause of action based upon a breach of any trust rela~
tionship. Necessarily, for this as well as the many other rea~
sons pointed out in this brief the Findings are not supported
by the evidence, the Conclusions are not supported by the
Findings, and the Judgment is not supported by the evi~
dence, Findings or Conclusions.
The board of directors having refused the president
the authority to sue, we sincerely submit that there was
no action by the plaintiff corporation, as A. W. Warr had
no authority to bring an action in its name. The plaintiff
by its own latches having failed to bring any action upon
the notes or keep them in good standing since 1935 and by
its own action in this respect having precluded itself from
any recovery whether or not there be security or otherwise,
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then by its own latches this court will bar it from main..taining this action.
Like\vise, any claim in this matter is barred by the
statute of lin1itations, for this plaintiff had complete knowl..edge of all of the facts from which any claimed fraud could
arise since 1934 and certainly since June or July, 1943.
It is further submitted that there was no valid offer
which the corporation could accept, and no recovery could
be permitted on that theory, and in any event the court
erred in permitting the introduction of evidence in the man..ner it did relative to the value of the stock and the date of
determining its value.
The court further erred in entering judgment for costs
and in failing to find upon the material issues raised by the
defendant.
WHEREFORE, defendant sincerely requests that this
court enter its order reversing the lower court and dis..missing this action.
Respectfully submitted,
McKAY, BURTON, NIELSEN
and RICHARDS

Attorneys /or Defendant
and Appellant.
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